

CANADA
and
BRITISH WARS

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TO THE MEMORY

of

THE RT. HON. SIR JOHN A. MACDONALD, G.C.B.,

whose "true and deep Canadianism was 'the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night' to the hundreds of thousands whom he led as no man could have led by a mere party banner"(a); who at the time of Canadian federation was "intent upon founding a Kingdom"(b); and who then proposed that the uniting Provinces "shall constitute and be One Kingdom under the name of the Kingdom of Canada"(c);

and of

THE RT. HON. SIR WILFRID LAURIER, G.C.M.G.,

whose aspirations with reference to the political development of his country were such as to permit expression of approval of my earlier writings,

this work is respectfully dedicated.

(a) Sir Jos. Pope: *Sir John A. Macdonald*, II, 344.

(b) *Ibid.*, I, 312.

(c) So in the draft constitution prepared by the Canadian delegates in London: Sir Jos. Pope, *Confederation Documents*, 143. ³²

Canada and British Wars

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Thoughtfully or Heedlessly?—The invitation of the British government to Canada (17 September 1922) to engage in a war which was thought to be imminent in connection with a squabble in the Near East, has raised in clear and concrete form the old question whether Canada ought to exercise judgment before sending her sons anywhere to kill and be killed, or whether, without hesitation or consideration, she ought to reply, "Ready, aye ready!" True Canadians answer one way. Imperialists answer the other. The issue is now clearly defined. Let it be definitely settled. The recent crisis is happily passed. Another may arise at any time. And what our government ought to do should not be left undecided. Are we to engage when our parliament says so, or merely when requested by a British government? Like bull-terriers, are we to fight when whistled for? Or, like intelligent human beings, are we to investigate and for ourselves determine (1) whether the stated cause is just; (2) whether, from Canadian point of view, it is worth a war; and (3) whether war is unavoidable. Fight, say the imperialists; inquiry is disloyalty and hesitation a crime; the enemy (Spaniards, Dutch, French, Germans, Turks, in their turn) are abominable brutes; our honor demands their suppression; and the peace of the world necessitates engagement in another war. Why should we have investigated, for example, in the crisis of September–October last? Was it not Mr. Winston Churchill, a Prince of Peace, who on that occasion blew the whistle?

Mr. Meighen, the chief spokesman of the imperialists, voiced their views when, addressing the Toronto Business Men's Conservative Club in September last, he said:—

"Let there be no dispute as to where I stand. When Britain's message came, then Canada should have said: 'Ready, aye ready; we stand by you.' I hope the time has not gone by when that declaration can yet be made. If that declaration is made, then I will be at the back of the Government. . . . Can anyone divine what is to be the result of a policy by which we determine for ourselves whether or not we leave to Britain, or share with her, the defence of treaties to which the honor as well as the signature of this country is pledged? Can anyone divine where it is going to lead us? or what will be the effect of the procrastinations of this week we are passing through?" (a).

"Determine for ourselves?" Certainly not. And yet, Mr. Meighen knew so little about the situation that he imagined that there was something in it about the defence of what he called "the Treaty of Sevres." There was not, for (1) there was no "Treaty of Sevres," and (2) so far from the British government proposing to "defend" the Sevres document, they had agreed to its supersession. To the imperialists, however,

(a) Ottawa Journal, 23 Sept. 1922.

all that is as irrelevant as, to a kennel of bull-terriers, it would be unintelligible. Listen to *The Montreal Star*:—

"A scattered Empire, such as ours, has no choice at a sudden crisis like this save to trust its leaders. If the British Government, with its special sources of information, decides that a firm stand must be taken on the Dardanelles, it would be an act of mad and egotistical folly for a journal or Government three thousand miles away to set up a different view."

Canadians knew almost nothing of the circumstances. The government themselves, who are supposed (by foolish people) to be kept informed—indeed, to be consulted—knew almost nothing. Mr. Lloyd George imagined that information was unnecessary. A whistle would suffice.

Sharply contrasted with this are the attitudes assumed by John Sandfield Macdonald, Sir John A. Macdonald, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier. The Trent affair (November 1861) having brought the United Kingdom and the United States to the verge of war, the British government, through the Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Newcastle, undertook to exercise pressure upon the Canadian government with reference to military preparation. Our parliament declined to pass the required legislation, and, thereupon, the Duke (21 August 1862) expressed his regret; urged resumption of efforts by the Governor General; indicated what ought to be done; suggested military co-operation with the other Provinces with "an Adjutant General of the whole force," etc. To this despatch, the government (Macdonald-Sicotte) replied in a long memorandum in which they said (*Italics now added*):—

"The Despatch of His Grace involves matters of the highest importance and affirms a principle which for the first time comes in a practical shape before the people of Canada. Your Excellency's advisers have not been unmindful of the discussions upon the subject which have taken place in the Imperial Parliament, but until now they have not been called upon to consider the principles of a policy so gravely affecting the relations of Canada to the mother country. . . . It is not doubted that the same mutual regard and confidence will be exhibited in any communication or negotiation which may follow His Grace's Despatch. At the same time, however, it is felt that in dealing with a question affecting so deeply the present and future welfare of the Province, care should be taken to base any arrangements that may be entered into *upon something more solid than sentiment, more enduring than any proposal not recognizing the rights and interests of the Canadian people.*"

After arguing in favor of the voluntary system, as preferable to the compulsory (the policy of the preceding government) the memorandum proceeded as follows:—

"The people of Canada, doing nothing to produce a rupture with the United States, and having no knowledge of any intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to pursue a policy from which so dire a calamity would proceed, are unwilling to impose

upon themselves extraordinary burthens. They feel that, *should war occur, it will be produced by no act of theirs*, and they have no inclination to do anything that may seem to foreshadow, perhaps to provoke, a state of things which would be disastrous to every interest of the Province. On this ground their representatives in Parliament assembled rejected the proposition to organize 50,000 men, or, indeed to commit the Province to a much smaller force; and recent elections in various localities embracing more than a third of the population of the Province, have shown that in this respect public feeling has undergone no change. . . . His Grace recommends 'a basis of taxation sounder in itself than the almost exclusive reliance on customs duties,' the evident intention being by direct taxation to obtain an increase of income commensurate with the increase of expenditure which would follow the organization of the large force proposed. . . . Your Excellency's advisers believe that no Government could exist which would attempt to carry out the suggestion of His Grace for the purpose designed."

"Another suggestion embraced in His Grace's despatch is well calculated to excite surprise. Your Excellency's advisers allude to that portion of the despatch in which His Grace proposes to remove the control of funds required for Militia purposes from the domain of Parliament. His Grace is evidently aware that the proposition wears the aspect of 'an interference with the privileges of the representation of the people,' and it is certain that any measure liable to this construction *never will be, and ought not to be, entertained by a people inheriting the freedom guaranteed by British Institutions*. The Imperial Parliament guards with jealous care the means of maintaining the military and naval forces of the Empire. Its appropriations are annually voted, and not the most powerful minister has dared to propose to the House of Commons the abandonment of its controlling power for a period of five years. If the disturbing action 'of ordinary politics' is a reason for removing the final direction of Military preparations from Parliament, it is in every sense as applicable in England as in Canada" (a).

Observe, next, the attitude of Sir John A. Macdonald in 1885. The British government, having established its military control in Egypt, proceeded to assist the Egyptians in the suppression of the Sudanese Arabs, who were asserting *their* right to be freed from outside oppression. In January 1884, Sir Charles Gordon had been sent to Khartoum, where, instead of spreading peace, he directed the hostilities; found himself beleaguered; and eventually was killed (26 February 1885). British feeling having been deeply stirred, the government announced that the power of the Mahdi (the Leader of the Sudanese nationalists) must be broken and Khartoum retaken (b). Under these circumstances, the British government sought the assistance of Canada, and to that Sir John replied in a letter to Sir Charles Tupper, the High Commissioner in London (12 March 1885) as follows (Italics now added):—

"I wrote you a hurried note the other day on this question, and have both before and since talked it over with my colleagues, and we think the time has not arrived, nor the occasion, for our volunteering military aid to the Mother Country. *We do not stand at all in the same position as Australasia*. The Suez Canal is nothing to us, and we do not ask England to quarrel with France or Germany for our sakes. The offer

(a) *Sessional Papers*, 1863, No. 15. (b) *Annual Register*, 1885, p. 344.

of those Colonies is a good move on their part, and somewhat like Cavour's sending Sardinian troops to the Crimea. *Why should we waste money and men in this wretched business?* England is not at war, but merely helping the Khedive to put down an insurrection, and now that Gordon is gone, the motive of aiding in the rescue of our countrymen is gone with him. Our men and money would therefore be sacrificed to get Gladstone and Co. out of the hole they have plunged themselves into by their own imbecility. Again, the reciprocal aid to be given by the Colonies and England *should be a matter of treaty, deliberately entered into and settled on a permanent basis.* The spasmodic offers of our Militia Colonels, anxious for excitement or notoriety, have roused unreasonable expectations in England, and are so far unfortunate. I daresay that a battalion or two of venturous spirits might be enlisted, but 7d a day will cool most men's warlike ardour" (a).

Please note the "should be a matter of treaty."

Note, finally, the attitude of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who, when speaking in the House of Commons (5 February 1900) in connection with the despatch of troops to South Africa, said:—

"I claim for Canada this, that in the future Canada shall be at liberty to act or not to act, to interfere or not to interfere, to do just as she pleases, and that she shall reserve to herself the right to judge whether or not there is cause for her to act"(b). Whether we are to fight when whistled for, or to adopt the practice declared nearly twenty-three years ago by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, is a matter for the Canadian parliament to determine. In aid of formation of opinion, I submit the following observations:

BULL-TERRIER ARGUMENTS.

PART OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE:—The argument most frequently adopted in support of the bull-terrier view is that Canada is part of the British Empire, and, therefore, ought always to answer, "Ready, aye ready." Whether Canada is part of the Empire is, however, a very debatable question. Take it either way: If she is, there can be no obligation of war-support, for the relationship between different parts of an empire implies protection of the subordinate by the dominant, and not assistance by the subordinate in the wars of the dominant. Earl Grey (Colonial Secretary from 1846 to 1852), in the course of his evidence before a select committee of the British House of Commons in 1861, said:—

"I think that the very notion of a colonial relation between this country and our possessions implies protection on one side and obedience on the other, within certain bounds" (c).

During the same inquiry, the Duke of Newcastle (Colonial Secretary 1852-3; 1859-64) testified as follows:—

"Q. May your opinion be stated in these terms, that the mother country having

(a) Pope: *Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald, 1840-1891.* pp. 337-8.

(b) *Debates*, 1900, I, col. 72.

(c) *Commons Papers*, 1861, vol 13, pp. 241-2.

assumed the government of the Colony, takes upon itself all the responsibility of its defence? A. Certainly."

"Q. No responsibility given to a Colony gives it the responsibility of declaring war? A. Certainly not".

"Q. The power, therefore, of declaring war imposes upon the Government the responsibility of protecting the Colony from the cost of war? A. Certainly." (a).

The Macdonald-Sicotte government of Canada, in its noteworthy reply to the Duke of Newcastle (above referred to), took still higher ground. It said:—

"Your Excellency's advisers now turn to the general argument which underlies the argument of His Grace. That the right of self-government has for a correlative duty the maintenance of provision for defence, is a proposition which in the abstract is indisputable in the case of Governments of States which are sovereign in themselves. As between a Colony and the Parent State it cannot be said to exist in the same sense. A British Colony must submit to all the consequences of conflicts produced by the policy which Her Majesty's Government may carry out in the interest of the Empire at large. It is not enough that a Colony endowed with self-government provides for the preservation of peace and order within its own boundaries. It is not enough that a Colony so situated must endure all the consequences of a line of action which its own Legislators have no voice in originating, and towards the termination of which they can do nothing. A further responsibility is held to attach to the Colonial relation. The Colony, although the theatre of ruinous hostilities, must furnish its quota in aid of the Imperial army and contribute a share to the attendant expenditure."

That further responsibility, the Canadian Government held, did not exist.

If any further authority as to the basis of colonial relationship is necessary, it may be found in the memorandum presented to the Colonial Conference of 1902 by the War Office:—

"Prior to the outbreak of the war in South Africa, so far as any general scheme for the defence of the Empire as a whole has been considered, it was assumed that the military responsibilities of our great self-governing Colonies were limited to local defence, and that the entire burden of furnishing reinforcements to any portion of the Empire against which a hostile attack in force might be directed must fall on the regular army" (b).

If, in any real sense, Canada is still a part of the British Empire, the foregoing extracts sufficiently show the extent of her responsibility. If, in the alternative, Canada, having ceased to be a colony, has acquired a status little short of that of a sovereign nation, she is only nominally a part of the British Empire: and it cannot be argued that, while we believed that we were rising from the humiliation of colonialism, we were in reality sinking into the bondage of serfdom (c).

(a) *Ibid.*, pp. 295-6.

(b) *Proceedings*, pp. 47-8. The subject is elaborately treated by M. Bourassa in his *Que devons-nous à l'Angleterre?*

(c) Serfdom is neither freedom, on the one hand, nor slavery on the other. As part of the feudal system, the lords' tenants promised fealty and war-service. Without questioning or hesitation, they responded to the whistle; and the docile serfs went as a matter of course. Like Canadians?

GRATITUDE:—To the assertion that gratitude for past protection imposes upon us a duty of participating in all British wars, there are two replies: First, nothing that has happened could obligate Canada to engage in a war which she believed to be unrighteous—to send her men to kill those who were defending the right. Canada, therefore, ought to consider well, and judge carefully, before she participates in war. Secondly, I deny that Canada is under obligation of gratitude. In former days, the European imperialistic nations fought one another for the possession of foreign territories. In the course of the struggle, the United Kingdom took Canada from France, not because she loved the 60,000 French settlers, but because of the value of the territory. If, afterwards, any British rival had sought to dispossess the British governors, British forces would have defended—what?—British property; for the same reason that a farmer would protect his hens—in order to get the eggs. In the 1840's, the United Kingdom adopted free trade; threw open her colonies to traffic with foreign nations; lost her interest, therefore, in Canada; and told her (in Tennyson's phrase) to "cut the cords and go." When thirty years afterwards, we became sufficiently strong to be of fighting value, we were told that gratitude for past protection demanded that we should regard ourselves as a reservoir of men and money which the British government could tap—could drain at will.

The claim becomes all the more curious when it is observed that, for two reasons, gratitude is due to us rather than by us. Observe, first, that Canada has never had a war on her own account, and that into those in which she has been engaged she has been plunged by her British connection—the two wars against the United States (a); the Crimean war; the Soudan war; the Boer war; the war of 1914-18. British acknowledgment of the value of Canadian assistance has on each of these occasions been very warmly expressed. Now we are told that the burden of our alleged debt of gratitude remains in all its categorical exigency. If debt there was, may we not say (as Kipling), "Lord God, we have paid in full."

Observe, next, that, so far from having enjoyed British protection, there have been but two occasions upon which the British navy has gone into action in connection with our (I include Newfoundland) quarrels, and in each case, although we were indubitably in the right, *the British fleet acted against us*. The first occasion was in connection with the seizure, by the United States cruisers, of our sealing ships on

(a) Nobody now offers apology for the British attempt to dominate the thirteen American colonies at the end of the eighteenth century, and few defend the British actions which induced the war of 1812-14.

the open ocean. In 1886, three vessels were seized, and one turned out of Behring Sea. In 1887, six were seized, and one not permitted to enter the sea. In 1888, no seizures, only threats. In 1889, five were seized, and two turned out of the sea. In 1890, threatenings only. And in 1891, the British fleet, which theretofore had bobbed comfortably at anchor in Esquimalt harbor, cleared decks and joined the American cruisers in pursuit of the Canadian ships. It was a mean job, and the Admiral excused his failure by asserting that the fog enabled the Canadians to escape him. The second occasion was when, in defence of an absurd claim of the French, a squad of British marines destroyed the lobster factories of Newfoundlanders on Newfoundland territory. In both of these cases, not only was it the opinion of the British government that our opponents were undoubtedly wrong, but, in the international arbitration in the one case (a), and in the British Privy Council in the other (b), our contention was authoritatively declared to be right. These, I repeat, are the only two occasions in which the British navy intervened in our affairs. In order adequately to mark our gratitude, how many Canadian soldiers ought we to contribute to the next British war?

Finally, contrast our history with that of any of the Spanish-American republics. Since their independence, not one of them has had the benefit of British protection. Not one of them has ever needed it. Not one of them has ever been attacked from overseas. And not one of them has ever been engaged in trans-oceanic war. Their immunity from attack and from war-engagement has been due to their freedom from European affiliations. Not one of them would accept such British protection as Canada has had, at the price which Canada has paid. They exercise and enjoy the right of every free community to engage in, or to abstain from war as they think proper. And if it be true that, of all the nations on the American continent, Canada alone is fettered in this regard—is, by reason of her political affiliation, incapable of settling for herself that most important of all questions—I, for my part, reply that she should “cut the cords and go.”

BRITISH WARS ALWAYS RIGHTEOUS:—To the argument that consideration of circumstances as they arise is unnecessary, for we may always be certain that British wars will be both righteous and unavoidable, I reply that history, down to and inclusive of the recent Near East crisis, gives us no such assurance. Quite the contrary. For the general characteristic of Great Britain and of all other imperialistic

(a) At Paris, 1892.

(b) Baird *v.* Walker, 1892, A.C. 491.

nations is the pursuit of self-regarding purposes. Expansion at the expense of other peoples is not the product of practices based upon the golden rule.

CHINA:—Commence recital with the wars of the 1840's to compel China to sanction the importation of opium. Nobody defends them now. I am glad that Canada escaped participation in these despicable crimes. Happily, British policy has in recent years undergone complete change. Reparation was impossible, but exportation of opium from India to China has been stopped. The Chinese wars yield no comfortable assurance for the future.

CRIMEA:—I pass the Crimean war of 1854-6 by quoting Lord Salisbury's sentence, "We put our money on the wrong horse." Two years of horrible war were spent in defending the Turks against the Russians—in upholding Turkey when the good of the world required that she should have been left to destruction. With some truth, it has been said that the war was induced by the insubordination of an ambassador (Stratford Canning) and the whim of a woman (the Empress of France). Canadians, unfortunately, assisted in the war. In Sir Wilfrid Laurier's opinion, they ought to have remained at home. Later events confirmed that view. We are all now of that opinion. The escapade yields no comfortable assurance for the future.

BERLIN CONFERENCE:—Pass on to the Berlin Conference in 1878. Russia and the Balkan Powers, in the course of war with Turkey, had reduced her to helplessness; Russia had forced her to sign the treaty of San Stefano; almost all of Turkey in Europe and large areas in Asia had been freed from Turkish rule, and advisable disposition of Thrace and Macedonia had been made. Pursuing her pro-Turkish policy, the United Kingdom intervened, and, by threatening war, compelled Russia to submit the arrangements to a conference at Berlin. There she insisted upon three disastrous changes: First, about thirty thousand square miles of territory and about two million people—predominantly Christian—in Thrace, Macedonia, and Asia Minor, were replaced under the heel of Turkey. Only by subsequent wars were they released. Second, in order that Turkey might have a strategic advantage, Bulgaria was divided into two parts. A war, eight years afterwards, reunited the parts. Third, the Slav provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, by several years of hard fighting, had just won their emancipation from Turkey, were placed under the domination of Austria-Hungary. That meanest—or among the meanest—of the actions of the Great Powers in Europe was one of the predisposing

causes (I distinguish between precipitating and predisposing causes) of the war of 1914-18. Incidentally, at Berlin, the United Kingdom, taking advantage of the helplessness of Turkey, forced the cession of the island of Cyprus (a). I am glad that Canada had no share in the furtherance of British policy at Berlin. I hate to witness the oppression of the little nations by the big. The most recent of the historians of the period refers to the British success in connection with the Conference as a "magnificent diplomatic achievement" but "a historic blunder." Territory which had been:—

"torn from the Turk was restored to the Turk; till well into the next century, Macedonia became a cause of diplomatic friction between small States and Great Powers alike, a potential cause of international hostilities, the scene of misrule, oppression, internecine strife, carnage, and finally war, until, after thirty-five years, Turkey was again reduced to about the same dimensions as were allotted to her at San Stefano. The terms of that still-born Treaty provided not only for the virtual disappearance of Turkey from Europe, they settled the still more thorny question of who was to inherit her dominions. But the supposed interests of the Great Powers were preferred to those of the peoples immediately concerned. The lessons of recent history passed un-noted. The nineteenth century had shown a succession of movements—German Italian, Greek, Serbian, and Roumanian—towards national union and national independence. Yet diplomatists set themselves to refute the logic of history and arrest the decay of Turkey; and it was left to another generation at great cost of men and treasure to accomplish what might then have been easily achieved, the destruction of Turkish influence in Europe" (b).

The episode yields no comfortable assurance for the future.

EGYPT:—By suppression of the aspirations of the Egyptians for national freedom in 1882 (by bombarding Alexandria, and defeating and exiling Arabi Pasha—the leader of the movement), the United Kingdom commenced occupation of Egyptian territory, merely because her military power made simple the furtherance of the interests of British bondholders (c). On various occasions she promised to withdraw. She is still there. Canada, fortunately, was not a party to that attack upon a smaller nation by a larger. Mr. Gladstone's excuse (in a letter to John Bright) for the bombardment of Alexandria was of the flimsiest. While he was contemplating the suppression by force, of the Egyptian nationalists:—

"a by-question," he said, "arises. The British fleet, lawfully present in the waters of Alexandria, had the right and duty of self-defence. It demanded the discontinuance of attempts made to strengthen the armament of the fortifications. . . . Met by fraud and falsehood in its demand, it required surrender with a view to immediate dismantling, and this being refused, it proceeded to destroy" (d).

(a) The great question of the moment being whether Turkey's sovereignty over her lost territories should be restored, or whether her dismemberment should stand, the United Kingdom threatened her with destruction if she refused to cede Cyprus: Lady Gwendolen Cecil, *Life of Robert Marquess of Salisbury* vol. II, pp. 264, 271; A. L. Kennedy, *Old Diplomacy and New*, pp. 36, 43.

(b) Kennedy, *op. cit.* pp. 31-2.

(c) If you do not think so, consult Lord Cromer's *Modern Egypt*.

(d) Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, vol. 3, p. 85.

The British fleet, which was menacing Alexandria, "had the right and duty of self-defence;" but the place menaced had neither right nor duty, and was therefore destroyed! In the same letter Gladstone said that he agreed with Bright's view that "most wars have been sad errors." The incident yields no comfortable assurance for the future.

SMALLER WARS:—Space-limitation requires that I pass the Afghan and various others of the smaller wars. As illustration of the customary relation between little and big nations, reference might well be made, for instance, to the Zulu and Matabele wars in 1879 and 1893, and to the various (British and other) imperial burglaries in China. These last provoked the Boxer nationalistic protests (1900) which the British and other troops suppressed. It was another example of the tender care with which the big nations always protect the rights of the little fellows—quite identical with the manner in which the whales protect the herring. None of these wars yields comfortable assurance for the future.

THE BOER STATES:—The suppression of the Boer republics commenced with the Jameson raid in 1895-6. Jameson ought to have been shot. Instead, he was comfortably interned for a short time in London, and afterwards made a baronet and Prime Minister in Cape Town. Rhodes, who was the principal conspirator in the affair, should also have been shot, or at least imprisoned and disgraced. Instead, he was fêted and lauded as one of the chief of the Empire builders. In 1899, Chamberlain, Milner, and Rhodes picked a quarrel with Krüger, and, after struggling for more than two years against the heroic defence of the Boers, painted the conquered territories with red on the map of the ever-expanding British Empire. It was a desperately mean transaction, and was rightly condemned by the world. During the recent war, when accepting the freedom of the city of Edinburgh, General Smuts said:—

"Thirteen years ago I was fighting against you. Now I am on your side. I have not changed. I was fighting for liberty then. I am fighting for liberty now."

During the same period (29 October 1917), when speaking at Tonypana, Wales, General Smuts said:—

"Just eighteen years ago, I left Pretoria to go into another war. . . . The position I took up, and still take up, is that that war was a war for freedom. It was a war of a small nation against the biggest nation in the world. We fought to the bitter end (Cheers), until all our men, women, and children were either in the field, or in concentration camps, or overseas, and then we gave in. We lost our liberty, but we soon got our liberty back again (Cheers)."

Yes. A new government in the United Kingdom recognized the wrong that had been done (a), and, although unable to restore the dead to life,

(a) Previous recognition had been made of an earlier wrong to the same people. Cf. Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, vol. 3, pp. 27-46; Mackintosh, *Joseph Chamberlain*, pp. 57-8.

made some amends, the imperialists of the day protesting that the war had been fought in vain. In Canada, Col. George T. Denison, for example, in a contribution to the *Standard of Empire* (16 January 1909), said:—

“Since 1902 also this present British Government have given up to the Boers a great many things which the Colonial contingents, with their British comrades, fought to preserve, and the feeling is very general in Canada that the Canadian blood shed on the fields of South Africa was a vain sacrifice to aid an Empire which is too feebly governed to profit by such loyal devotion” (a).

For attack by a huge empire upon a little people, never were such hollow pretences asserted. The chief of them being the ill-treatment of British Indians by the Boers, read what happened after the war had placed control in the British government:—

“The position of the Imperial Government is, however, rendered the more difficult, since before the Boer War the ill-treatment of the British Indians formed a subject of severe remonstrance to the Boer Government at Pretoria, and as high an authority as Lord Lansdowne expressed the view that the treatment of the British Indians was the worst of the crimes of the Transvaal Republic. The irony of fate resulted in the failure of Lord Milner, as Governor of the Transvaal after the war, to remedy even one of the grievances which the Indians had, while the administration of the laws with the strictness of the new régime, as contrasted with the laxity of the old, made the position of the Indians a good deal less favorable than it had been before the war. To crown all, Lord Milner actually suggested the passing of legislation which would have made the conditions for the Indians much worse than before, but happily Mr. Lyttelton declined to accede to this discreditable suggestion. It is, indeed, impossible to resist the conclusion that either the protests made before the war with the approval and aid of the High Commissioner, Lord Milner, were unjustified, or that the policy of leaving these wrongs unredressed after the war was unjustifiable” (b).

Perhaps the best known argument for suppression of the Boer republics was the refusal of Krüger to make such amendments in his naturalization laws as would enable British subjects to become Boer burghers. The demand was probably the most extraordinary that had ever been presented by one nation to another. Always, theretofore, the United Kingdom had most zealously guarded her subjects from foreign attempts to affect their British allegiance. “Once a British subject, always a British subject” had originally been the governing maxim, and sharp controversy with the United States had attended American denial of claim based upon its assertion. Nevertheless, Chamberlain and Milner sought quarrel with Krüger by insisting that Boer laws should provide a means by which British subjects should be enabled to cease to be British subjects and become Boers. From 31 May to 5 June

(a) Lord Milner declared that the government's action was “a great and capital error mischief had been done which could never be retrieved”: *National Review*, xlviii, p. 5; quoted in Farrer, *England under Edward VII*, p. 149.

(b) Professor A. Berriedale Keith: *Imperial Unity and the Dominions*, pp. 202-3.

1899, at Bloemfontein (a), Milner urged submission to this demand. Afraid of the addition to the electorate of many thousands of unsympathetic foreigners, but afraid also of the coercive power behind his antagonist, Krüger agreed to reduce the period of residence necessary for naturalization from fourteen years to seven, with special provisions for persons who had been residents before 1890 (b). But to no avail. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain (Colonial Secretary) instructed Milner that:—

“no franchise reform will be accepted which does not give the Uitlanders (outsiders) some genuine representation in First Volksraad at once” (c).

And Sir Alfred insisted upon

“an immediate and substantial share of political power for the Uitlanders” (d).

There can be little doubt that Canada would not insist, at the point of the bayonet, upon a foreign country transforming a Canadian into a foreigner. That the purpose of Chamberlain, Milner, and Rhodes was to pick a quarrel with the Boers becomes evident when it is observed that the Uitlanders did not want to cease to be British, or German, or American, and become Boers. They had left home for the purpose of gold and diamond mining, and, if left to their own devices, would never have thought of entering their names on the rolls of the Field Cornets. Being assigned to commandoes, with obligation to fight against the countries of their birth was not their desire, and Milner was well aware of that. He knew that unless he could say to these men that they might become burghers only for the purpose of speedily voting themselves back again, his scheme would fail. Indeed, at one stage of his conversation with Krüger he was indiscreet enough to admit that he would have difficulty in getting the Uitlanders to lend themselves to his purpose. He said (*Italics now added*):—

“The whole basis of my negotiations is that they must be citizens of one State or the other. The President must recognize my difficulty. *It is an extremely difficult thing for me to propose that the people whose interests I am defending should give up the citizenship which they at present have and to which they are sincerely attached. They will not do so readily, but I am sure that this is the only solution; and if I am to recommend this great sacrifice to them, then I must be able to point out to them that they are going to obtain something really valuable in return. Therefore, with reluctance I have come to the conclusion that the best way to enable these people to have their reasonable desires attended to, is to urge upon them to take up the citizenship of the State in which they are living, that is to say, those of them who desire to live there, and to have their families there, and to bring up their children there, and to make it their permanent place of residence*” (e).

(a) *British Blue Book*, 1899, C.9404.

(b) Afterwards, he made further provisions.

(c) *British Blue Book*, 1899, C.9415, p. 14.

(d) *Ibid.*, pp. 44, 46.

(e) *British Blue Book*, 1899, C. 9404, p. 40.

Chamberlain and others had been asserting, and afterwards they continued to assert, that the Uitlanders had been clamoring to become Boer burghers. Milner revealed, or rather acknowledged, that they would "not do so readily"; that nevertheless, in his opinion, "the only solution" was "to urge upon them to take up the citizenship of the State in which they are living" (a).

Defending his country, in language singularly out of harmony with so much that we have recently heard, a representative Englishman, Colonel Amery (for a time Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, and now First Lord of the Admiralty), said:—

"Much sympathy has been wasted on little peoples 'rightly struggling to be free,' whose chief struggle has been to wreck satisfactory political institutions and create unprovoked discords, for the sake of politically isolating some stray fragment from the world's ethnological scrap heap, or of propagating some obscure and wholly superfluous dialect. Little sympathy is bestowed on the great peoples rightly struggling for mastery, for the supremacy of higher civilization, and higher political principle" (b).

Canada, I am ashamed to admit, participated in the attack upon "the little peoples." It is probably the meanest bit of purely imperialistic plundering that will ever stain the pages of Canadian history. Our newspapers cannot fairly say "Texas" to the United States. The treatment of the Boers affords us no comfortable assurance for the future.

GERMANY:—Becoming dissatisfied with the much-boasted policy of "splendid isolation," the Salisbury government endeavored in 1898, 1899, and again in 1901—three separate occasions—to arrange an alliance with Germany having in view (among other things) the exclusion of France from the exploitation of Morocco. Germany was shy. No agreement could be made. But the advances are noteworthy because of what afterwards happened in Morocco.

JAPAN:—In 1902, the United Kingdom was tricked into making an alliance with Japan, who was then eager for a fight with Russia. Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Minister, would have been glad enough to see a check put upon Russian activities in the Far East, but could not be induced to sign a treaty with Japan until, by the sending of a Japanese mission to St. Petersburg, he was led to apprehend that the two eastern Powers might coalesce as against British interests. It was a sly dodge (c). The treaty was a disastrous blunder. It was, in its effects, one of the predisposing (not precipitating) causes of the war of 1914-18.

(a) Chapter XXXI in Mackintosh: *Life of Joseph Chamberlain*, pp. 228-238, may usefully be read in connection with the above. The Boer point of view may be seen in Davitt: *The Boer Fight for Freedom*, pp. 16-29; 40-49, and *passim*.

(b) *The Times History of the War in South Africa*, vol. I, p. 22.

(c) Parts of the story may be seen in *The Secret Memoirs of Count Hyashi*; Eckardstein, *Ten Years at the Court of St. James*; and A. L. Kennedy, *Old Diplomacy and New*, pp. 101-3.

FRENCH TREATY:—While Japan was reducing Russia to relative military impotence, and, by so doing, elevating Germany's position in Europe, the United Kingdom, in order to maintain the disappearing balance of power (a), found it necessary to enter into entente relations with France, and, for that purpose, to make arrangements which, upon any other than imperialistic principles, were indefensible. The two Powers had been thwarting each other—France objecting to British assumptions of power in Egypt, and the United Kingdom objecting to French assumptions in Morocco. Each, for the moment and in its own interest, was protecting a small nation as against the exploitations of a big one. Tired of their simulated philanthropy, they agreed to get out of each other's way. And they did. Such proceedings yield no comfortable assurance for the future.

MOROCCO:—Having bought off the United Kingdom, and having previously arranged with Italy and Spain, France proceeded (1905) with her dominating plans in Morocco, only to be reminded by Germany that there was an imperialistic Power with which she had made no arrangements. France resented the interference. Germany proposed submission to a conference of the thirteen Powers who had signed the Madrid treaty with reference to Morocco in 1880. France at first refused, but, yielding to the advice of the President of the United States, finally submitted. In her refusal, France was clearly wrong, but, nevertheless, during the crisis, the United Kingdom promised to render her military assistance in case of war. That was plain notice to Germany that whenever, and for whatever reason, European war broke out, one of her enemies would be the United Kingdom. It was a reckless exhibition of embittering policy. It accounts for much that afterwards happened in Europe. For escape from world-war in 1905, we are probably indebted to President Roosevelt. The incident yields no comfortable assurance for the future.

RUSSIAN TREATY:—The French treaty and the Morocco incident naturally led to a British treaty (1907) with the ally of France—Russia—by which their competitive imperialisms in various places (Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet) were brought to compromise. Persia, a helpless nation, had been in process of crushing between the Russian nippers in the north and the British in the south. The two Powers now agreed to separate zones of influence—each to leave the other free in its own

(a) The most recent writer upon the subject has said: "But the Entente Cordiale is usually regarded as the most important event of modern diplomacy because it betokened an international distribution of power. It re-established the equilibrium of Europe. Since the war in the Far East, Russia had become a broken reed to her ally. France lay at the mercy of Germany": Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

zone. Russia went rapidly ahead, and Sir Edward Grey found himself obliged to make sacrifice of probity on the altar of advisable entente solidarity. Were it not for almost universal ignorance concerning foreign affairs, nobody would ever dare to speak of "the defence of the small nations by the larger," save as when two wolves are protecting, as against each other, the fated lamb. No comfortable assurance for the future can be found in imperialistic exploitations, or in the palpable insincerities of current phraseology. Rather, because of general ignorance and credulity, are they warning and menace.

OTHER INCIDENTS:—I must pass reference to British policy in connection with the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908; the second of the Morocco incidents in 1911, when the United Kingdom was again willing to engage in war in defence of French exploitations; the Turco-Italian war of 1911-12; and the two Balkan wars of 1912-13. The general characteristics of British policy during these wars were: (1) the maintenance of peace—Sir Edward Grey evincing much skill in the endeavor; (2) for the purpose of peace among the big nations, the sacrifice of the interests of the smaller—Serbia and Montenegro, for example, sacrificed to Austria and Italy at the end of the war against Turkey, a desperately mean transaction; (3) settled determination to side with France and Russia in case of war—no matter what the cause; and (4) constant military collaboration with France in preparation for war with Germany, and less frequent collaboration with Russia and Belgium for the same purpose. The story yields no comfortable assurance for the future.

LORD SALISBURY.

If anyone thinks that I have been unfair to the United Kingdom, I should like to submit to him two points: First, let him observe that I have been dealing with and condemning but one phase of British activities. Had my subject necessitated a wider survey, I should have been glad to express my hearty appreciation of British achievements in many other departments—in literature, in science, in scholarship, in parliamentary government, and in other lines. I am very far from being anti-British. By descent—on both sides—I am Scotch, and, although I was born in Toronto, I spent five years of my later life in the north of Morayshire. I still retain pleasant memories of the whins and heather of the lovely Cluny Hills. In my opinion (possibly biassed), the British Empire is the best empire that the world has seen, and the British people (especially the Scotch) the best people in the world—

outside of Canada. But these facts furnish no reason why Canada should be a mere source of supply of men and money for employment in the wars of a government in which she has no representative, and over the policy of which she has no influence.

Secondly, I would suggest perusal of Lord Salisbury's condemnation of British foreign policy. His language is much stronger than mine. Writing in 1864, he said that British foreign policy

"Had been essentially a policy of cowardice. . . . a policy which, according to the power of its opponent, is either valiant or submissive—which is dashing, exacting, dauntless to the weak, and timid, and cringing to the strong" (a).

Lord Salisbury mentioned seven cases "illustrative of the mode in which" (as he said) "we deal with the smaller class of Powers"—Greece, China, Tringanu, Epé, Ionian Islands, Brazil, and Japan while she was still undeveloped. Passing to instances of prudent submission to the stronger Powers, Lord Salisbury specified quarrels with the United States, Russia, and Prussia, using in these connections such phrases as "a policy of bluster"; "fresh humiliation;" "continental contempt;" "empty threats;" "dishonoring bluster." These are not phrases which I should care to employ. When afterwards in office, Lord Salisbury maintained the practices which he had condemned; as witness his actions at the Berlin Conference; his truculent dealing with Portugal and the Transvaal; and his humiliating obsequiousness on two occasions toward the United States—Venezuela and the Behring Sea (b).

THE WAR OF 1914-18.

If the record of the United Kingdom down to 1914 affords no comfortable assurance that all her future wars will be both righteous and inevitable, what lessons ought we to draw from the great war that commenced in that year?

BRITISH EMBARRASSMENT:—Sir Edward Grey did what he could in July 1914 to avert war, but his previous actions had made success difficult. By military collaboration with France; by agreeing to allocation of stations for the respective fleets—the British in the North Sea and the French in the Mediterranean; by his letter to the French Am-

(a) *Essays*, pp. 155-227.

(b) If Lord Salisbury showed a bold front to France in 1898 in connection with the Fashoda affair, it was not only that he could not depart from the policy marked out for him in 1895 by Sir Edward Grey, then Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Rosebery administration (*Ann. Reg.* 1898, p. 159), but that he took little risk in adhering to it. For in France, 1898 was "the Dreyfus year"; the year of a special attack by the monarchists upon the Republic; and the year in which Delcassé, as French Foreign Minister, was pursuing his policy of the formation of an entente with the United Kingdom—the formation of an anti-German bloc.

bassador of 22 November 1912; by conduct such as made war-co-operation with France a matter of honorable obligation; by repeated denials, nevertheless, in the House of Commons that anything had been done which could in any way limit the perfect freedom of his government (a)—he had brought himself into such embarrassment that neither could he declare neutrality if Belgium were not invaded (as had Mr. Gladstone at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870), nor could he declare that his country would implement her engagement with France. There is excellent reason for believing that if, when Austria-Hungary sent her demands to Serbia, Sir Edward had declared for solidarity with France, there would have been no war (b). And it is almost certain that if he had not refused to agree to neutrality upon condition of Belgium being unmolested, German troops would never have crossed the frontier.

Nevertheless, I find it hard to lay any blame at the door of Sir Edward Grey. Amid the selfish rivalries; the eager imperialisms; the hatreds; the well-founded apprehensions; the huge preparations for the certainly approaching war, Sir Edward was little more than one of the ships whirling rapidly to the maelstrom in which all were to be engulfed. Could he have dissolved the war partnerships, instead of closely associating with one of them; could he have dispelled distrust and fear, and established trustworthy friendships; could he have extinguished economic competitions, and eradicated monopolistic exploitations; could he, in short, have changed the nature of modern development, he could have avoided appeals to arms. These things were, for the most part, beyond his power. He and the other diplomatists knew well enough where they were going. All that they hoped for, and all that for the previous ten years they had succeeded in accomplishing, was postponement of the fatal day.

(a) The incident reminds one of what has been referred to as "a lie in the grand style" of Lord Salisbury, when, in June 1878, in answer to a question as to whether an arrangement had recently been made with Russia, he said: "The statements to which the noble Lord refers, and other statements which I have seen are wholly unauthentic, and are not deserving of the confidence of your Lordships' House" (Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 54). A few days afterwards a newspaper published the full text of the agreement.

(b) Mr. President Wilson, in a New York address (4 March, 1919), said: "We know for a certainty that if Germany had thought for a moment that Great Britain would go in with France and Russia, she would never have undertaken the enterprise" (*Current History*, April 1919, p. 105, quoted by Lord Loreburn: *How the War Came*, p. 176). That was the opinion of the Russian Foreign Minister, the French President and Foreign Minister, the Belgian Ambassador (Beyens) at Berlin, and Mr. Bonar Law. Denying the assertion, Viscount Grey, in an address during the recent elections (*Ottawa Citizen*, 6 November, 1922), replied as follows: "It has been said that if I had used language of greater firmness before the war, it might have been avoided. No language would have avoided it. If I had used language committing this country any further than I used, you would have had a divided government, a divided house of commons—even the Conservative party divided on the matter—and a divided country." Sir Edward had, during the eight years preceding the war given pledges of assistance to France which plainly amounted to "an obligation of honor" (as Mr. Lloyd George, a member of the pledging government, expressed it) to assist France in case of war with Germany. And when the time came—when avowal of intention to implement the pledge might have prevented not only the necessity for taking arms, but the war itself, the Viscount tells us, he could do nothing. It is a deplorable confession. Not only in Germany are promises scrapped. It is said that Mr. Lloyd George, more than any other member of the cabinet, was responsible for Sir Edward Grey's inability to give France the assurance which she was entitled to expect: *Quarterly Review*, October 1922, p. 286.

Nevertheless, it may fairly be said that neither Lord Lansdowne (who framed the 1904 treaty with France) nor Sir Edward Grey, who succeeded him at the Foreign Office (1905), made any attempt to dissolve the partnerships. Well aware that their existence made certain that every quarrel between individual members of the opposing groups would in reality be a quarrel between the partnerships, and that war which might, as formerly, have been fought between two nations, would in the future automatically expand into European conflagration, these Foreign Ministers, nevertheless, pursued a policy which consolidated the groups and hardened their antagonisms. If we ask, Why did they so act?, the answer is that the rapidly-developing dislike of Germany—the fear of Germany, the enmity, or the hostility toward Germany (describe it as you will), was much more consonant with consolidation of allied union opposed to Germany than with disjunction of those who shared the dislike or enmity. Ask yourself why the United Kingdom joined with France and Russia, and your answer will tell you why her European policy between 1904 and 1914 centered upon maintenance, at almost any expense, of the war-combination which she had joined. Then ask, once more, whether Canada ought to have had to suffer because of the pursuit of such a policy.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR:—As already indicated, distinction ought to be made between the predisposing causes (I prefer to call these the roots) of the war, and the precipitating causes. The whole subject is much too large for treatment here. I must content myself with stating—very shortly, and therefore inadequately—the conclusions at which, after prolonged study of the immense mass of material now available, I have arrived.

1. The chief of the predisposing causes in western Europe was the desire of France to repossess herself of Alsace and Lorraine, which had been taken from her in a war which she had precipitated.

2. The chief of the predisposing causes in eastern Europe was the inclusion of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For the inception of that situation (Berlin Conference, 1878), the United Kingdom and Austria-Hungary were principally responsible. For its development Austria-Hungary was alone responsible.

3. The predisposing causes, as between the United Kingdom and Germany were : (1) German competition in manufactures, trade, mercantile marine, and war navy; (2) the substitution of Germany for France (the British traditional enemy in western Europe) as the potential

aggressor upon Belgium and Holland, and the consequent establishment of a menace upon the North Sea coasts; and (3) the substitution of Germany for Russia (the British traditional enemy in eastern Europe) as the potential aggressor upon Constantinople and India.

4. A general predisposing cause was the erection of Europe into two vast military camps, for which all the Great Powers were, in varying degrees, responsible.

5. Turning to precipitating causes, Serbia had on two occasions—in 1881 and, again, as late as 1909—promised Austria Hungary, in writing, that she would pursue a course of neighborly conduct. Notoriously and admittedly (indeed now boastfully asserted) in breach of these promises, eager and persistent efforts were made to create dissatisfaction in the Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary, with a view to their annexation to Serbia.

6. Signor Nitti, the Italian Prime Minister who signed the peace treaty at Versailles, has recently said:—

“It cannot be said that in the ten years preceding the War, Russia did not do as much as Germany to bring unrest into Europe. It was on account of Russia that the Serbian Government was a perpetual cause of disturbance, a perpetual threat to Austria-Hungary. The unending strife in the Balkans was caused by Russia in no less degree than by Austria-Hungary” (a).

7. Austria-Hungary was justified in resenting the efforts to detach her provinces. She had good reason for thinking that, for her security, the suppression of Serbia was necessary. The incident (the assassination of Franz Ferdinand) which produced her 48-hour ultimatum (23 July) was more pertinent and important than, for example, the Ems affair in 1870, or the blowing-up of the Maine in 1898.

8. Austria-Hungary ought, without delay, to have accepted the very submissive reply of Serbia (25 July) as a basis either for negotiation or for settlement by an international conference. Sir Edward Grey urged the latter course. Germany not only strongly seconded the proposal, but threatened withdrawal of her support from Austria-Hungary. Under these circumstances, Austria-Hungary was wrong in declaring war against Serbia (28 July). She did it prematurely, in order to avoid peace-pressure. After three days, she submitted, and the prospects of a peaceful solution became good.

9. Negotiations were ended by Russia ordering mobilization against Germany. This was done secretly on the 29th July, in defiance of the

(a) *Peaceless Europe*, pp. 83-4.

express directions of the Czar, who, the next day, was pressed into sanction of it. Germany demanded cessation of mobilization. Russia refused. Not willing to give Russia time to bring her millions of men to the frontier, Germany justifiably declared war. For interruption of the negotiations, which might well have avoided war, Russia was responsible.

ADMISSIONS OF PRIME MINISTERS:—Much more important than my opinion upon these points is the fact that Prime Ministers of the Allies are already becoming somewhat frank as to the causes which produced the war. Mr. Lloyd George, for example, has said:—

“The more one reads memoirs and books written in the various countries of what happened before the first of August, 1914, the more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite meant war at that stage. It was something into which they glided, or rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly, and a discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it” (a).

Signor Nitti, after referring to what was dinned into us during the war about might and right, justice and injustice, etc., has said:—

“All these meaningless phrases were brought out during the War, according to which, as was said by one of the Prime Ministers of the Entente, the War was the decisive struggle between the forces of autocracy and liberty, between the dark powers of evil and violence and the radiant powers of good. To-day all this causes nothing but a smile. Such things are just speechifying, and banal at that.”

Adding to these words, Nitti tells us why it was that we were misled:—

“Perhaps they were a necessity of war-time which might well be made use of; when you are fighting for your very life you use every means you have; when you are in imminent danger you do not choose your weapons, you use everything to hand. All the War propaganda against the German Empire, recounting, sometimes exaggerating, all the crimes of the enemy, claiming that all the guilt was on the side of Germany, describing German atrocities as a habit, almost a characteristic of the German people, deriding German culture as a species of liquid in which were bred the microbes of moral madness—all this was legitimate, perhaps necessary, during the War” (b).

At another page, Nitti said:—

“When our countries were engaged in the struggle, and we were at grips with a dangerous enemy, it was our duty to keep up the *morale* of our people and to paint our adversaries in the darkest colors, laying on their shoulders all the blame and responsibility of the War. But after the world conflict, now that Imperial Germany has fallen, it would be absurd to maintain that the responsibility of the War is solely and wholly attributable to Germany, and that earlier than 1914 in Europe there had not developed a state of things fatally destined to culminate in a war” (c).

Letting in part of the truth, Nitti tells us that:—

(a) At a meeting of the Empire Parl. Assn., 23 December 1920.
 (b) *Peaceless Europe*, pp. 90, 21.
 (c) P. 33.

"When it will be possible to examine carefully the diplomatic documents of the War, and time will allow us to judge them calmly, it will be seen that Russia's attitude was the real and underlying cause of the world-conflict" (a).

Nitti was not the first to acknowledge the necessity for deluding people during and immediately prior to war. M. Ollivier, the French Prime Minister, when offering excuse for some of his actions just before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, declared that, when war has become inevitable, "*notre devoir est de la rendre populaire*" (b). During the Crimean war, Queen Victoria severely reprimanded her Prime Minister because, in a speech in the House of Commons, he had entered (as she said):—

"into an impartial examination of the Emperor of Russia's character and conduct" (c).

History is full of instances of the application of this idea of duty. Pitt, for example, when inciting the British people to war against France in 1793, exploited the execution of the French King which, to his own mind, was not a circumstance necessitating war (d). Canadian statesmen quickly learned their duty in this regard, and, during the recent war, there was no country in which discussion was more elaborately prohibited. An Order-in-Council of April 1918 recited:—

"Whereas the mind of the people should be centered upon the proper carrying out in the most effective manner of that final decision, and that all questioning in the press or otherwise of the causes of that war, the motives of Canada, Great Britain, or the Allies, in entering upon and carrying on the same and the policies by them adopted for its prosecution, must necessarily divert attention from the one great object on which they should be so centered, and tend to defeat or impede the effective carrying out of that decision";

and proceeded to declare that "it shall be an offence"

"to print, publish, or publicly express an adverse, or unfavorable statement, report, or opinion concerning the causes of the present war, or the motives, or purpose for which Canada, or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or any of the Allied nations entered upon, or are prosecuting the same, which may tend to arouse hostile feeling, create unrest, or unsettle, or inflame public opinion"

under penalty of a maximum fine of \$5,000, or of imprisonment for five years, or both (e).

Canadians had no chance of knowing, and they did not know what were the various reasons which actuated the various countries in enter-

(a) P. 11.

(b) It is our duty to make it popular.

(c) *Letters of Queen Victoria, 1839*, vol. 3, pp. 34-5.

(d) Cf. Lecky: *History of England in the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 7 pp. 157-8.

(e) The excuse for deluding people with mistatements, or of preventing them hearing the truth, is the necessity for the maintenance of a fierce fighting attitude toward the enemy. Were the facts stated fairly and were discussion permitted, the nation would be divided against itself, and successful issue rendered impossible. Unfortunately, choice must be made between falsehood and truth-suppression on the one hand, and defeat on the other. For adoption of the usual course of action, all that can be said is that moral delinquencies are not the worst of the evils engendered by war.

ing the war. Now anyone who cares to read may learn that nearly all that we were told during the war was not true. The following facts are of particular importance: Russia, in pursuance of her traditional desire to control Constantinople, backed Serbia; France supported Russia, in pursuance of her treaty-promise to that effect; the United Kingdom supported France, in pursuance of a secret obligation entered into by the British government in November 1912, and of a course of conduct which made honorable abstention impossible; Canada supported the United Kingdom, purely because of her political affiliation (a); during the war a new—a democratic—Russia declared that she did not want Constantinople, and withdrew from the war; thereupon the French reason for participation ceased, the British reason ceased, the Canadian reason ceased; and, notwithstanding the absence of these reasons, the war continued for another year at a cost per day of thousands of lives and of probably nearly a hundred million of dollars. For what reason? Why were the offers of peace rejected? We were told that prevention of future wars made persistence necessary.

"It is war for the end of war,
Fighting that fighting may cease.
Why do the cannons roar?
For the thousand years of peace."

So we were told, but no one of our leaders who had kept control of his senses believed a word of it. Was it then, as Dean Inge now declares, that "we were all mad?" Or was it because of the anticipated war-spoils: Alsace, Lorraine, Syria, etc., to France; Trieste, Trentino, Adalia, etc., to Italy; Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, to Serbia; Bersarabia, Transylvania, Bukovina, to Roumania; Macedonia, Thrace, Smyrna, etc., to Greece; and to the United Kingdom and Dominions, huge territories in Southeast Africa, Southwest Africa, South Sea Islands, Palestine, Mesopotamia with its oil? A good Britisher once said:—

"We went into the war with the most unselfish of motives, and it will be blooming hard luck if we do not get something out of it."

If these were the motives for continuation of the war, the victors deserve that they should now share with the vanquished the burden and peril of the conditions under which Europe is staggering—Europe and Eastern Asia distracted as never before; the nations more antagonistic than ever before; and general bankruptcy from the Bay of Biscay eastwards to the Pacific. Switzerland the only exception. Europe is reaping what it sowed.

(a) On 1 August, when our offer of assistance was sent, the United Kingdom was not at war; nobody knew whether she would be at war; Belgium was not invaded until the 4th; war was not declared until the 5th; our purpose as declared was "to ensure the integrity and maintain the honor of our Empire," neither of which was, at the time, in danger.

WHAT OF CANADA?:—And what of blameless Canada? She had no share in the pre-war diplomacies of which Mr. Rowell courageously said to the assembled diplomatists at Geneva on 8 December 1920:—

“Fifty thousand Canadian soldiers under the sod in Europe is the price Canada has paid for the European statesmanship which drenched the continent in blood” (a).

To that price must be added the tens of thousands of disabled, and the two billions of debt. There is no *per contra*. Canada took no part of the spoil. The United Kingdom, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand made large territorial acquisitions (b), while from the valuable phosphates of the island of Naru, monopolized by three of them, Canada was excluded. And our war-liability, if the imperialists are to have their way, is very much greater than prior to 1914. Observe the following:

1. By taking a mandate for Mesopotamia, and afterwards by entering into a treaty with King Feisal (10 October 1922), whom she set up there, the United Kingdom has become responsible for the defence of a territory which, as Lt. Gen. Sir Herbert Gough estimates, has a military

“front of at least 550 miles with a line of communication of about the same length” (c).

It is the only territory dependent upon British defence which cannot be reached by the British navy (d).

2. By taking a mandate for Palestine, the United Kingdom has assumed a task impossible of accomplishment and bristling with probabilities of peril. No British channel now separates the United Kingdom and France. Between French Syria and British Palestine there is only a line. Already the two countries have been at quarrel over Damascus.

3. Although present at the Peace Conference in Paris, the Canadian representative, Sir Robert Borden, is not responsible for these commitments. In the debate which preceded the Imperial Conference of 1921, he said:—

(a) *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 December 1920.

(b) Seeley's *The Expansion of England* (1890) is itself in need of expansion. In 1880, the British area covered 8,644,000 square miles. Now it extends to 13,388,000. Recent acquisitions from Germany are estimated at almost a million square miles, with a population of eight millions. In the last four decades, British people have increased from 271 to 447 millions—about sixty per cent. “The Empire now comprises considerably more than a quarter of the estimated population of the world, and close on to a quarter of its land surface” (*United Empire*, December 1922, p. 737).

(c) *Common Sense*, 3 April 1920.

(d) In order to protect her Arab proteges, Husein and Feisal, the United Kingdom purchased the quietude of their rival, Ibn Saud, by means of a cash payment of £20,000 and a subsidy of £5,000 per month: *The Times*, 29 November 1922. Ought Canada to pay her share?

"I should regret to see the Empire engage in difficult commitments, whether in Eastern Europe or Western Asia, or elsewhere. We have quite enough and perhaps more than enough, on our hands at present."

Mr. Rowell agreed with Sir Robert. He said:—

"I share entirely the views expressed by the hon. member for Kings (Sir Robert Borden) in reference to Western Asian and Eastern European commitments."

In his ministerial platform, issued during the recent British elections, Mr. Bonar Law said:—

"In all our foreign relations we intend to pursue an even course, loyally fulfilling the obligations we have undertaken, but resolutely determined not to extend our commitments, and, should reasonable occasion arise, to curtail them" (a).

There can be little doubt that he was referring to the situation in the Near East.

4. The territories taken by the United Kingdom, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand may well be regarded as a certain pledge of future war. Beyond question, they will be reclaimed by Germany as soon as opportunity offers. For forty-three years after Prussia took Alsace-Lorraine from France, friendship between the nations was impossible. For forty-eight years (including the war period) the marble representation of Strasburg in the Place de la Concorde carried its mourning drapery. Germany has much more reason for harboring hate, and purposing revenge, than had France.

Upon the whole, the diplomacies (commencing with the Berlin Conference of 1878) which led to the great war, and the diplomacies accompanying its termination, supply no comfortable assurance of the wisdom of British Foreign Ministers, or that their peace-making plans are such as Canada can approve.

If it be said that Canada was represented at the peace conference and that her parliament ratified the treaty of Versailles, the answer is that, under extremely stressful circumstances, we found that our concurrence in the Lloyd George plans and concessions was necessary, however little we liked them. It is impossible to involve us, for example, in the disparity between the agreement on the faith of which Germany laid down her arms, and the clauses of the treaty imposed upon her with reference to the amount to be paid in respect of war-damages. By the agreement "compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population


(a) *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 October 1922. Answering a question in the House of Commons, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said: "The additional expenditure incurred to date in connection with the Near Eastern crisis was estimated at £2,478,000." (*The Times*, 28 November 1922). Ought Canada to "pay her share?"

BULGARIA

WESTERN THRACE

EASTERN

AEGEAN SEA



o Kirk

o Karagatch o Adrianople

Dedeagatch

R. Maritza

o Enos

Ganos

Suvla Bay

Anzac Cove

Imbros

GALLIPOLI

o Chanak

o Bigha

Dardanelles

CHANAK

Tenedos

Mitylene

o Smyrna

A

To

BULGARIA

BLACK SEA

WESTERN THRACE

EASTERN THRACE

TURKEY

SEA OF MARMORA

CONSTANTINOPLE

ÆGEAN SEA

CHANAK

ASIA MINOR



Sevres proposed boundary

To Angora →

To Adalia



of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."

In the treaty, these simple words were quite indefensibly expanded into the following:—

"(5).....all pensions, and compensation in the nature of pensions, to naval and military victims of war (including members of the air force), whether mutilated, wounded, sick, or invalided, and to the dependents of each victim."

(6) The cost of assistance by the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to prisoners of war and to their families and dependents.

(7) Allowances by the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to the families and dependents of mobilized persons or persons serving with the forces."

Canada is not responsible for this expansion, for it was necessitated by the declarations made by Lloyd George during the elections which intervened between the armistice and the treaty: for example:—

"All the European Allies have accepted the principle that the Central Powers must pay the cost of the war up to the limit of their capacity" (a).

Referring to the episode, Mr. J. M. Keynes has truly said:—

"There are few episodes in history which posterity will have less reason to condone—a war, ostensibly waged in defence of the sanctity of international engagements, ending in a definite breach of one of the most sacred possible of such engagements on the part of the victorious champions of these ideals" (b).

No, Canada is not chargeable with that breach of engagement (c).

THE RECENT NEAR EAST CRISIS

PARTITION AGREEMENTS DURING THE WAR:—For understanding of the recent Near East crisis, some short reference must be made to previous history. These credulous persons who believed that the purpose of the United Kingdom in entering the war of 1914-18 was protection of the small nations must learn that, besides arranging for the partition of Albania among British friends; besides purchasing the co-operation of Roumania with promise of territories some of which were peopled principally by Serbians; besides assuming military occupation of neutral Greece (including the treaty-neutralized island of Corfu), and forcing her into the war; besides assigning to Italy territory occupied by Slavs, Dalmatians, and Albanians; besides assigning to Japan, Chinese territory stolen by Germany—besides all this and much more, arrangements were made for distribution among the Allies, of all but a fraction of the Turkish Empire.

(a) Quoted from a statement of policy and aims issued on 6 December 1918 by Mr. Lloyd George. Cf. J. M. Keynes: *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, p. 130.

(b) *Ibid.*, pp. 133-4.

(c) The above is only one of various respects in which the peace treaty violated the terms of the armistice agreement. As Lord Parmoor has well said of the Wilson fourteen points (the basis of the agreement) "There is no trace of their influence on the face of the finished document" (*Contemporary Review*, February 1920, p. 167).

Prior to Italy entering the war, Russia, by arrangement with the United Kingdom and France (March 1915), was to have

"The town of Constantinople, the western coast of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles; Southern Thrace, as far as the Enos-Media line; the coast of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and the River Sakaria, and a point on the Gulf of Ismid to be defined later; the islands in the Sea of Marmora, and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The special rights of France and England in the above territories were to remain inviolate" (a).

Part of the consideration for British concurrence in this arrangement was the assent of the Russian government to the expansion of the British zone of influence over the only part of Persia which the two governments had left unallocated by their treaty of 1907.

By the treaty of London (26 April 1915), Italy's co-operation with the Entente Allies was purchased, not only by assignment to her of valuable territory, but by an acknowledgment of her right, "in case of a partition of Turkey," to receive

"a share equal to theirs in the basin of the Mediterranean—viz., in that part of it which adjoins the province of Adalia, in which Italy has already acquired special rights and interests defined in the Italo-British Convention" (b).

In May of the next year (1916,) the United Kingdom, France, and Russia made an agreement as to their "zones of influence and territorial acquisitions" in Asiatic Turkey. Russia was to acquire the four Armenian vilayets of Trebizond, Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis. The others were to get other huge portions (c).

About the same time, the United Kingdom and France, by promise of the establishment of an Arab independent kingdom, induced Husein, the Arab King of the Hijaz, to declare war against Turkey. The subsequent interpretation of the treaty by the Allies was a grievous disappointment to the King (d).

Discovery by the Italians of the agreement between the United Kingdom, France, and Prussia, of May 1916, having led to a demand by Italy for the delimitation of the "share equal to theirs," the treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne was signed (April 1917), by which she was to receive the Adalia district, and a sphere of influence which would include Smyrna (e).

Russia's renunciation, in 1917, of all claim to participation in war-spoils reduced the area of contemplated annexation. With that ex-

(a) Cocks; *The Secret Treaties*, p. 19. Cf. Toynbee: *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, p. 47.

(b) Cocks; *op. cit.*, p. 39. Cf. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

(c) Cocks, *op. cit.*, p. 43. Cf. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-50; House and Seymour: *What Really Happened at Paris*, p. 182.

(d) Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-9.

(e) *Ibid.*, pp. 51-2.

ception, the treaties just referred to represented the purposes of the Allies prior to the arrangements of Sevres. And these related to Turkish territory only (a).

THE ANGORA PACT:—The acknowledged defeat of the Turks and the terms of the armistice signed at Mudros, 30 October 1918 (b), seemed to make certain the realization by the Allies of their imperialistic purposes. Nevertheless, they were to be disappointed. The Turks had been defeated, but far from annihilated, and the western conception of nationalism had supplanted, to large extent, the merely racial and religious character of their political ideals. No attempt having been made by the Allies during the following year to arrive at terms of peace; indications having pointed to a determination on their part to reduce Turkey to negligibility; the Greeks having taken possession of Thrace, and of Smyrna with a portion of its hinterland (May 1919); and the Sultan's government being regarded by his subjects as much too complacent, Mustapha Kemal Pasha (after much preliminary work) set up, in August 1919, a separate government (c), first at Erzerum and afterwards at Angora, with a view to resistance.

"By the end of 1919, the nationalist movement had been accepted by nearly the whole of Asia Minor, and the Ottoman Government at Constantinople became a government representing little, and wielding no authority" (d).

On 19 September of that year the National Congress formulated its demands—very moderate demands—in a document usually referred to as the "Angora Pact." On 28 January of the following year it was approved by the Constantinople parliament. The following is a translation of the preamble and the six articles of the pact as published in the Official Gazette:—

The members of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies recognize and affirm that the independence of the State and the future of the nation can be assured by complete respect for the following principles, which represent the maximum of sacrifice which can be undertaken in order to achieve a just and lasting peace, and that the continued existence of a stable Ottoman Sultanate and society is impossible outside of the aforesaid principles.

FIRST ARTICLE.—Inasmuch as it is necessary that the destinies of the portions of the Turkish Empire which are populated exclusively by an Arab majority, and which on the conclusion of the Armistice of October 30, 1918, were in the occupation of enemy forces (e), should be determined in accordance with the votes which shall be freely given by the inhabitants, the whole of these parts, whether within or without the said Armis-

(a) The agreement (1916-17) by which France was to arrange the government of all German territory west of the Rhine, and Russia to settle Germany's eastern boundary, is both interesting and illuminating. The correspondence may be seen in Bausman: *Let France Explain*, pp. 249-253.

(b) A summary of the terms of the armistice may be seen in *Annual Register*, 1918, p. 149.

(c) The constitution may be seen in *Fortnightly Review*, November, 1922, p. 712.

(d) *Ency. Brit.*, XXXII, p. 801.

(e) These territories are Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia, Egypt, all of which are now under control of non-Turkish Powers.

tice line, which are inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority, united in religion, in race, and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other and of sacrifice, and wholly respectful of each other's racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance (a).

SECOND ARTICLE.—We accept that in the case of the three *Sanjak* (b), which united themselves by a general vote to the Mother Country when they first were free, recourse should again be had, if necessary, to a free and popular vote.

THIRD ARTICLE.—The determination of the juridical status of Western Thrace also, which has been made dependent on the Turkish peace, must be effected in accordance with the votes which shall be given by the inhabitants in complete freedom.

FOURTH ARTICLE.—The security of the city of Constantinople, which is the seat of the Caliphate of Islam, the capital of the Sultanate, and the headquarters of the Ottoman Government, must be protected from every danger. Provided this principle is maintained, whatever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and all other Governments concerned with regard to the opening of the Bosphorus to the commerce and traffic of the world is valid.

FIFTH ARTICLE.—The rights of minorities as defined in the Treaties concluded between the Entente Powers and their enemies and certain of their associates shall be confirmed by us, in reliance on the belief that the Moslem minorities in neighbouring countries will have the benefit of the same rights.

SIXTH ARTICLE.—It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic progress should be rendered possible, and that it should also be possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more modernized and regular administration. For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, financial, and other matters (c). The conditions of the settlement of our proved debts shall likewise not be contrary to these principles (d).

THE GREEKS IN ASIA MINOR:—Smyrna is the most important city in Anatolia. It has a population of about 250,000, fully one half of whom are Greeks. It is the principal commercial outlet for an immense hinterland in which there are no Greeks. Why did the Greeks land troops there on 16 May 1919? And why did some of the Allies encourage them? For a combination of reasons.

During the earlier period of the great war, King Constantine and Prime Minister Venizelos differed as to the advisability of Greek participation in the struggle. The King was for neutrality. Venizelos pressed strongly for hostilities against the national enemy, the Turk,

(a) The territories here referred to are those of Cilicia, which was surrendered to Turkey by the Franco-Turkish agreement of 20 October 1921, and the Mosul province of Mesopotamia, which the British hold.

(b) Batum, Kars, and Ardahan.

(c) This refers to the capitulations, which give foreigners in Turkey advantages of various sorts.
 (d) As reproduced in *The Times* of 1 December 1922. Toynbee (*op. cit.*, pp. 209–210) supplies another translation of the Pact, differing from the above in two material respects: In article 4, Toynbee inserts "and of the Sea of Marmora" after the words "Ottoman Government;" and in article 6, he inserts the word "judicial" after the words "development in political".

with a view to acquisition of large areas of his territory, and by possibility, re-establishment of the old Byzantine Empire at Constantinople. In January 1915, the United Kingdom made offer of partial realization of these aspirations in return for military co-operation and the transfer of some Greek territory to Bulgaria. In two long letters to the King (a), Venizelos strongly urged acceptance of the proposal.

"But to-day," he said, "we are called upon to take part in the war—no longer merely to discharge a moral duty, but in exchange for compensations which, realized, will constitute a great and powerful Greece such as even the most optimistic could not have imagined a few years ago."

"Under these conditions, how could we let pass this opportunity furnished us by divine Providence, to realize our most audacious ideals? An opportunity offered us for the creation of a Greece absorbing nearly all the territory where Hellenism has predominated during its long and historic existence? A Greece acquiring stretches of most fertile land, assuring to us a preponderance in the Ægean Sea?"

The King being obdurate, Venizelos at length (September 1916) set up a revolutionary government at Grecian Salonica (where the French and British troops had established a military base), and two months afterwards (24 November) declared war upon Turkey and Bulgaria. The King being still unmoved, the French troops took possession of Athens, dethroned him, and established Venizelos in control (June 1917). At the elections of 1920, Venizelos was overwhelmingly defeated, and fled. At the ensuing referendum to determine whether the King should be requested to return, 999,954, out of a total of 1,013,724, voted Yea. Italy had taken no part in any of these proceedings.

If, now, it be observed that it was during the period of Venizelos' occupancy of power that the Greeks went to Smyrna, one of the reasons both for the expedition, and for encouragement of it by the Allies, will appear. It was in accordance with Venizelos' original policy, and support of him was an acknowledgment by the United Kingdom and France of his war-assistance.

Another, and more substantial motive actuated these Allies, namely, that although Turkey had been defeated, Kemal was already demonstrating that not without further fighting could his nationalists be sufficiently subdued and silenced. Not wishing themselves to engage in further war, the United Kingdom and France thought that they saw in the eagerness of Venizelos a means by which effort on their part might be avoided (b). Their purposed territorial aggrandizements could be realized at the expense of Greece.

(a) 24 and 30 Jan. 1915. Hibben: *Constantine I and the Greek People*, pp. 551-560.
(b) Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 59, 61, 74, 92.

Professor Toynbee has suggested a motive peculiar to the United Kingdom as follows:—

“The British Government cannot keep troops mobilised in the East to enforce eventual terms of peace upon Turkey; Greece can provide the troops and enforce the terms with British diplomatic and naval backing, and she will gladly do so if these terms include her own claims. If Greece makes these claims good through British backing, she will have to follow Great Britain’s lead. She is a maritime power, a labyrinth of peninsulas and islands, and the territories that she covets in Anatolia are overseas. In short, if Turkey can be dominated by the land-power of Greece, Greece can be dominated by the sea-power of Great Britain, and so the British Government can still carry out their war-aims in the Near and Middle East without spending British money and lives’ (a).

THE ITALIAN TREATY:—But a difficulty intervened. Prior to Constantine’s dethronement, the treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne (above referred to) had been made, and by it the Smyrna district had been assigned to Italy. What was to be done about that (b)? Something very curious. On 23 April (1919), President Wilson published a sort of manifesto in which, in almost specific terms, he made appeal to the Italian people as against the attitude assumed by their representatives at the peace conference. The next day, and in consequence of the President’s action, these gentlemen withdrew from the conference, and did not return until the 5th of the next month (c). Meanwhile, Venizelos, who, theretofore had been strongly opposed by Italy (d), made good use of the reduction of “the Big Four” to “the Big Three”—Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson. The treaty with Italy was found to be defective in that, although signed by the United Kingdom and France, it had not been approved by Russia (e). The Americans, who formerly were opposed to Venizelos, now favored him (f), and:—

“Under a secrecy which kept knowledge of this decision absolutely from the office of the American advisers upon Turkish affairs, he (Venizelos) gained permission to occupy Smyrna with Greek troops” (g).

That was one of the reasons for subsequent Italian dislike of the Greeks.

Whatever the motives of “the Big Three” may have been, the facts that the Greeks acted with the full authorization of the United Kingdom (h), France and the United States (i); that the conquest and sub-

(a) *Ibid.*, p. 74.
 (b) There was still further difficulty, namely, the armistice with Turkey. That ought to have kept the Allies inactive. (c) *Annual Register*, 1919, pp. 170-2.
 (d) House and Seymour: *What Really Happened at Paris*, pp. 191-2.
 (e) *Ibid.*, pp. 185-194. Professor Toynbee makes a mystery out of the “flaw” in the treaty: *op. cit.*, pp. 52, 77. (f) House and Seymour, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-4.
 (g) *Ibid.*, p. 194. The *Encyc. Brit.* (XXXI, 630) has the following story: “When, after President Wilson’s famous message, the Italian delegation left the Conference, in April 1919, the British, French, and U. S. representatives reconsidered the whole question of Asia Minor, and while Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau hesitated to tear up the St. Jean de Maurienne agreement altogether, President Wilson forced the hands of his colleagues into deciding to send the Greeks to Smyrna under the belief that a massacre of Christians was imminent.” And see *Current History*, October 1922, p. 34.
 (h) The Gounaris-Curzon letters of 15 February and 6 March 1922, read by Lord Birkenhead in the House of Lords (*The Times*, 8 December 1922), make clear the very benevolent character, toward Greece, of the supposed neutrality of the United Kingdom as between Greece and Turkey. They disclose, for example, the existence of an agreement of 22 December 1921, whereby the British government signified its consent to the conclusion of a loan not exceeding £15,000,000 and the granting of security for such a loan.
 (i) Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 78.

jection of Anatolia was an enterprise beyond the military capacity of Greece; and that the policy pursued by the United Kingdom, from the beginning to the end of the enterprise, was mistaken and disastrous, are indisputable.

EFFECT OF GREEK LANDING—The effect of the landing of the Greeks, the ensuing massacres (a), and the later advances of the Greek army, had the effect which might with certainty have been anticipated. Kemal Pasha was greatly strengthened; Turks rushed from all quarters to his support; and Russia furnished supplies. Occupation of Constantinople by the Allies (16 March 1920) further inflamed Moslem passion; brought sympathetic assurances from the Islamic world; and made advisable an invitation to Venizelos to interpose his forces between the Kemalist army and the Constantinople Allied outposts (b). For this service Greece was promised Eastern Thrace and territory to the east of Smyrna. Greek troops (it was stipulated) were not to advance to Kara Hissar or Eski Shehir (c).

These arrangements and the subsequent treaty proposals of Sevres were all during the reign of Venizelos. On King Constantine resuming his throne (19 December 1920), relations with the Allies changed. France became antagonistic, and the King, repudiating the prescribed territorial war-limitations, proceeded against the Turks as he pleased (d); declined mediation offered by the British (21-25 June 1921) (e); tried again; reached Kara Hissar and Eski Shehir, and attempted Angora: failed and fell back (5 August—23 September); was, in turn, driven to the coast, and finally forced to withdraw even from Smyrna (23 August—9 September, 1922).

THE "SEVRES TREATY":—While the Greek campaign was in course of successful prosecution, and while Venizelos still continued to represent Greece at the Paris conference, the document which has been called "the Treaty of Sevres" was signed (10 August 1920). It was a document in the form of a treaty to which fourteen Powers were named as parties, but which never went into operation (f). For although it was signed by the Powers named in it, none of them ever ratified it, and ratifications,

(a) *Ibid.*, pp. 78-9; House and Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

(b) The Boulogne Conference 21-22 June, 1920: Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 92, 352. Cf. *Ann. Reg.* 1920, p. 244.

(c) Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-9, 368.

(d) *Ibid.*, p. 232.

(e) *Ibid.*, p. 98; *Annual Register*, 1921, p. 226.

(f) It may be seen in *British Treaty Series*, 1920, No. 11; *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, July 1921, Supp., p. 179. Comparison of the Sevres proposals with the previous treaties may be seen in Toynbee, *op. cit.* pp. 53-4.

therefore, were never exchanged (a). I do not overlook the fact that Canada passed a statute enabling the government to take certain action under the document when it became a treaty, and I agree that that statute may be regarded as a ratification by Canada. But Canada, as Canada, was not a party to the document. The British Empire was the party, and ratification would necessarily be the work of all parts of the Empire. I am not aware whether any action was taken by the other Dominions; but there was no ratification by the United Kingdom, and therefore none by the British Empire. The last clause of the document clearly defines what must be done before "the Treaty will come into force" (b). The prescribed proceedings were never taken.

In civil life, a contract between individuals, is constituted not merely by affixing signatures to it, but by delivery of it to the opposite party. A man may sign a document in the form of a promissory note, for example, but he incurs no liability until he hands it to the payee. The constitution of a treaty between Powers requires a threefold process: (1) signature by representatives of the Powers; (2) ratification by each of the Powers (by the monarch, or parliament, or other competent authority); and (3) exchange between the Powers of the ratifications. Until all that has been done, the document is imperfect and ineffective. At most, it remains as a record of the terms to which it was thought that, possibly, the Powers might agree. The present Lord Chancellor of England was undoubtedly right when, in his book on *International Law*, he wrote:—

"It follows from the immensity of the interests involved, and the infinitely complex personality of the parties, that the negotiations between plenipotentiaries are more nearly akin to the *pourparlers* of a contract than to its formation" (c).

Mr. Meighen was probably unaware of the facts when he addressed The Toronto Business Men's Conservative Club on the 22nd September, for his remarks (d) indicated that he believed not only that the "Treaty of Sevres" (as he called the document) was in force, but that the British government had asked Canada to aid in the defence of it. In a communication to the Press, the Prime Minister replied as follows (in part) :—

"In the first place there is, in reality, no Treaty of Sevres. On August 10, 1920, the Allies formulated certain proposals to Turkey. These were embodied in the form of a treaty which was subsequently signed by representatives of the Allied countries,

(a) Greece herself, at the instance, it is said, of the Allies, refrained from ratification: *Current History*, October 1922, p. 34.

(b) "A procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the Treaty has been ratified by Turkey on the one hand, and by three of the Principal Allied Powers on the other. From the date of this procès-verbal the Treaty will come into force between the High Contracting Parties who have ratified it."

(c) 4th ed. p. 101.

(d) Quoted ante, p. 5.

but which never became operative, and by which no one, therefore, was bound. A second and third set of proposals have since been framed, and there is now a fourth under consideration."

In reply, Mr. Meighen said:—

"It is true that formal documentary ratification for purpose of deposit at Paris with the original treaty did not come from Turkey because of the overthrow of the Turkish Government whose representatives signed the treaty, and that consequently similar formal ratifications were not sent by the Allied Powers."

That ought to have ended the appeal to the "Treaty of Sevres." But it did not. In an address at Smith's Falls on 28 November last, Mr. Meighen said:—

"The hand of Canada was set to the stipulation of a treaty that the Straits of the Dardanelles should be internationalized. Canada's signature was attached to the treaty. Parliament ratified the treaty. Canada agreed with Great Britain that the stipulations of the treaty were fundamental. The Turks marched to the Bosphorus, threatened to enter Europe and tear to shreds the treaty. Great Britain, left practically alone, asked Canada if her assistance would be forthcoming if the need arise. Canada, whose assurance of support, if needed meant more in the crisis than that of any other Dominion, was lacking" (a).

To which the replies are : (1) there never was such a treaty, for, as Mr. Meighen had previously said, "formal ratification was not sent by the Allied Powers:" (2) the Turks did not threaten to "tear to shreds the treaty," for there was nothing to tear; and (3) the Turks had always been willing to discuss the neutralization of the Straits.

OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE A TREATY:—It will be observed that, besides alleging that Canada was a party to the "Treaty of Sevres," there is the assertion that for that reason there is on our part a duty to enforce performance of its provisions. It is a curious notion. A party to a contract must implement his own engagement, but that he is either legally or morally bound to compel performance of the obligations of the other party is a doctrine improvised by Canadian imperialists for the present occasion. The British government has steadily declined to assist France in enforcing the treaty of Versailles.

PROVISIONS OF THE SEVRES DOCUMENT:—Contemporaneously with the signing of the Sevres document (b), three other documents were signed—one between the United Kingdom, France, and Italy (c), and

(a) *The Journal*, Ottawa, 29 November 1922. Many of the newspapers held Mr. Meighen's view. The *Toronto Globe*, usually well informed, ended an editorial with the following: "We should at least call the parliament of the Dominion and repudiate in a formal and effectual way Canada's adhesion to the Treaty of Sevres. . . . Is the Treaty of Sevres to become another historic scrap of paper?" *The Round Table* of December 1922 (p. 19) had the following curious observation: "The Dominions were signatories to the Treaty of Sevres. That fact does not bind them to maintain the provisions of the Treaty when a changed position calls for its revision by agreement. But at least the signatures do bind the Dominions to take part in the task of revision—we presume that they have been invited to send representatives to Lausanne." They had not been invited to the "revisions" of March 1921 and March 1922. And they were not invited to Lausanne. The whole incident demonstrates the danger of our meddling with extra-Canadian affairs.

(b) *British Treaty Series*, 1920, No. 11; *Am. Jour. Int. Law.*, *Supp.*, July 1921, p. 179.

(c) *British Treaty Series*, 1920, No. 12; *Am. Jour. Int. Law.*, *Supp.*, April 1921, p. 152.

two others between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and Greece (a. b). Taken together, the provisions of these documents in which we are now interested provided (in part) as follows:—

1. The Turks were to retain Constantinople, subject to deprivation for non-performance of any of the multitudinous provisions (There are 433 articles) of the Sevres document.

2. The Turks were to retain a very restricted hinterland in Europe.

3. Greece was to have all the rest of Turkey in Europe, extending to the Black Sea, including both Eastern and Western Thrace and, as part of the former, the extremely important peninsula of Gallipoli.

4. Greece was to have the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, the guardians of the mouth of the Dardanelles—one on each side of it.

5. Greece was to administer Smyrna and a hinterland in Asia Minor for five years; after which certain proceedings were to be taken to determine whether the territory would be incorporated definitely in the Kingdom of Greece.

6. Large parts of Asia Minor were assigned to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy.

7. Turkey renounced all claim to Armenia, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Hedja, Egypt, Soudan, Cyprus, Morocco, Tunis, Lybia, and the Ægean islands.

8. What was termed "the zone of the Straits" was described by a line extending from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea on each side of the Straits (a term, inclusive of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus). Speaking generally, this area was to be demilitarized so far as Turkey was concerned. But by article 178 (c) of the Sevres document

"The said Powers, acting in concert, shall have the right to maintain in the said territories and islands such military and air forces as they may consider necessary to prevent any action being taken, or prepared, which might directly or indirectly prejudice the freedom of the Straits."

Article 37 was as follows:—

"The navigation of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus, shall in future be open, both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or of war, and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag."

The Sevres document also contained provisions for the establishment of an international "Commission of the Straits" (somewhat on the lines of the Danube Commission) to control the waters between the Med-

(a) *British Treaty Series*, 1920, No. 13; *Am. Jour. Int. Law, Supp.*, April 1921, p. 161.

(b) *British Treaty Series*, 1921, No. 13; *Am. Jour. Int. Law, Supp.*, July 1922, p. 126.

(c) Compare article in *The Nineteenth Century* Nov., 1922, p. 697, and an address by Major J. D. Henry, D.S.O., B.E., reported in *United Empire*, December 1922, p. 764.

iterranean and the Black Sea—that is, to take charge of the construction of any necessary works, of lighting, buoys, pilotage, towage, anchorage, etc. On this Commission the representatives of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and Russia were each to have two votes. Turkey, Greece, Roumania, and Bulgaria were each to have one.

9. Turkey was not to maintain an army of more than 50,000 men, and these were to be distributed over the various areas.

“Article 162. All measures of mobilization, or appertaining to mobilization, or tending to an increase of the strength or of the means of transport of any of the forces provided for in this Chapter are forbidden. The various formations, Staffs and administrative services shall not, in any case, include supplementary cadres.”

“Article 165. The Turkish armed forces shall in future be constituted and recruited by voluntary enlistment only. Enlistment shall be open to all subjects of the Turkish State equally, without distinction of race or religion.”

“Article 174. The manufacture of arms, munitions, and war material, including aircraft and parts of aircraft of every description, shall take place only in the factories or establishments authorized by the Inter-Allied Commission referred to in Article 200.”

10. For naval protection, Turkey was limited to seven sloops and six torpedo boats.

“Article 186. The construction or acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Turkey.”

In this way, Turkey was not only to be reduced in size to a fragment of what she had been, and not only were territories predominately peopled by Turks to be handed over to the imperialistic Powers, but she was to be rendered impotent as against attacks by her historic enemies, Russia and Greece—the latter established within easy distance of Constantinople. Such a scheme as that of the Sevres document was as absurd, as impracticable, as provocative of future war as was the Versailles treaty of peace with Germany (a).

The reason assigned for the diminishment—almost the annihilation—of Turkey was that the horrors of Turkish rule could not be permitted to continue. That was pretence. Had it been real, the Powers, once in possession of Turkish territory, would have remained there (b). They did not. On the contrary (as we shall see), they all agreed that the Sevres document should be superseded. Mr. Lloyd George recently

(a) Toynbee, op. cit., p. 145.

said that he never approved it. Even Armenia has been restored to Turkey (a).

REVISION OF SEVRES DOCUMENT, MARCH 1921:—The change at Athens from Venizelos to King Constantine (19 December 1920) and the increasing probability of the Turks being able to offer substantial opposition to the Greeks, induced the Allies to invite representatives of Greece, and of the Angora as well as the Constantinople government, to attend a meeting of the Allied Supreme Council in London in February-March 1921. After discussion, proposals for modification of the Sevres document were formulated (b), providing, among other things, for withdrawal of the menace of termination of Turkish sovereignty in Constantinople; eventual evacuation, by the Allies, of Constantinople, and the admission there of Turkish troops; Turkish chairmanship of the Commission of the straits; substantial increase in the Turkish army; reduction of the demilitarized areas; establishment of a Turkish navy; economic liberty; provisions relating to Kurdistan, Armenia, and Smyrna—including Turkish sovereignty over the vilayet, Greek troops in the town, mixed gendarmerie outside, mixed civil administration and, for government, a Christian Governor, “appointed by the League of Nations, and assisted by an elective Assembly and an elective Council.”

“The Greek and Turkish Delegations, on receiving these proposals from the Supreme Council, left London to submit them to their respective Governments. Simultaneously with the departure of the Greek Delegation from London, a royal decree called up the 1913, 1914 and 1915 classes of Greek reservists, and King Constantine issued a proclamation declaring Greece’s intention to continue the war against the Kemalists in order to insure the pacification of the Orient. On March 23, a new Greek offensive was launched in Asia Minor” (c).

PROPOSALS OF MARCH 1922:—Failure of the Greek campaign in 1921 led to a reconsideration of the project. France and Italy were frankly unsympathetic, and the United Kingdom dreaded being involved in further war. Under these circumstances, M. Gounaris, the Greek Prime Minister, had an interview with Lord Curzon in London on 27 October 1921; represented that Greece was unable to provide funds for further military operations; intimated apprehension as to probable

(a) How natural it is to spend hundreds of millions in controlling Mesopotamia, with its advantages of oil and strategical situation, and yet to leave Armenia, with no advantages, unprotected, was illustrated by Mr. Bonar Law when, speaking in the House of Commons, he said: “The hon. gentlemen said something more—something which to my mind is really vital. He talked about our protection of the Armenians. There is not a man in this House who would not like to do it, but we must have regard to our condition. We have suffered, in my judgment, as much from the war almost as some of the countries whose financial position is not nearly so good as ours because of the efforts we have made to make our central financial position sound, and to make new capital available for trade. We have suffered as much as anyone, but our Powers are limited if we are to have fair play for our own people (Hear, hear.) I, for one, say—and I will put it that, so far as I am concerned, this is a fundamental matter—we cannot police the world. We want to help the world, but we cannot, and, so far as I am concerned, we will not do it alone. (Cheers.)”: *The Times*, 24 Nov. 1922. Note the cheers. The British government had been prepared, only a few weeks previously to fight Turkey, and perhaps Russia, “alone” in order to establish a Gibraltar at Gallipoli.

(b) The document may be seen in *The Times* of 14 March 1921.

(c) *Annual Register*, 1921, p. 225.

disappointment with reference to expected territorial gains; and was told that the speedy establishment of peace was advisable (a). After some hesitation, the Allies, in March 1922, prepared a set of proposals which formed a strong contrast to the purposed imperialisms of the secret war-treaties, the Sevres document, and even the revision of 1921 of that document. The items which, for present purposes, are the most important are as follows (*Italics now added*):—

1. The evacuation, by the Greeks, of Asia Minor, “and the restitution of Turkish sovereignty over the whole of that region. Should this operation be successfully accomplished, the Turkish sovereignty in Asia will exist unimpaired from the Mediterranean to the Straits and the Black Sea, and from the borders of Trans-Causasia, Persia, and Mesopotamia to the shores of the Ægean.”

2. “The interests of peace and the safety of the future demand that Europe shall never again be exposed to the perils and sacrifices which were imposed upon her in 1914 and the succeeding years by the forcible closure of the Dardanelles. The countless lives that were there poured out, the stupendous efforts that were entailed, must not have been expended in vain. The Turks will be re-admitted to the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles under conditions which will provide for the existence of a broad demilitarized zone in order to obviate the possibility of any hostile military preparations in that quarter. *But an Allied force must be placed, and must remain, in occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to safeguard the free and unimpeded entrance of the Straits.* This will also be a demilitarized zone (b). The Allied garrison will consist of a force sufficient to secure the entrance to the Dardanelles.

The navigation of the Straits will be placed, as already proposed, under the control of an International Commission under a Turkish President, on which it is hoped, as times passes, that all the principal States who are interested in the commerce or navigation of the Straits will be represented.”

3. A line, running northerly and northeasterly from Ganos on the Sea of Marmora to the Bulgarian frontier, was to divide Eastern Thrace into two parts—the eastern half (including Adrianople) to be Turkish and the western (including the Gallipoli peninsula) to be Greek. Both parts of Eastern Thrace were to be demilitarized (c).

4. Smyrna was to revert to Turkey.

5. Allied forces were to be withdrawn from Constantinople after the treaty of peace.

6. Large increase in Turkish army.

7. Improved proposals with reference to finance and the capitulations.

8. Protection of minorities.

(a) Letter, Gounaris to Curzon, 15 Feb. 1922; read by Lord Birkenhead in House of Lords: *The Times*, 8 Dec. 1922.

(b) Demilitarized by Turkey, but fortified by the Allies, if they so desired.

(c) Inasmuch as France and Italy had, twelve months previously, agreed to support diplomatically the claim of Turkey to the whole of Eastern Thrace, the above clause must be regarded as the limit of concession to which the United Kingdom was willing to agree. In order that she might establish herself in Gallipoli, she desired that the Greeks, rather than the Turks, should own the peninsula.

"The case of the Armenians has called for special consideration by reason of the undertakings entered into by the Allied Powers in the course of the war and the cruel sufferings of that people. Accordingly the aid of the League of Nations is authorized, over and above the protection accorded by the minority provisions to which reference has already been made, in order to obtain for the Armenians the satisfaction of their traditional aspirations for a national home."

These proposals were rejected by Turkey. In their turn, they have been superseded by events. "Defending the Treaty of Sevres" now would be an acrobatic anachronism of interesting type.

FRENCH AND ITALIAN SEPARATE SETTLEMENTS:—At the meeting of the Supreme Council in March 1921 (when proposals for revision of the Sevres document were formulated) wide differences of opinion had separated the United Kingdom from France and Italy. The two latter had lost any sympathy which they had ever had with the Greeks (a) and, almost certainly, disagreed with the Lloyd George proposal for establishment of a Gibraltar on the peninsula of Gallipoli. They were determined, moreover, to end the war-operations which the Angora government were pressing upon them (b). Unable to agree with the British statesmen, the representatives of France and Italy, while yet in London attending the meeting of the Council, entered into separate arrangements with the representative of the Angora government—Bekir Samy Bey—which really amounted to treaties of peace. The Italian agreement (12 March) was as follows (*Italics now added*):—

"1. The two Governments at Angora and Rome have in view Italian-Turkish economic collaboration with the right of priority for concessions of an economic character to be accorded in the Sandjaks of Adalia, Meugia, Bourdour, and Sparta, and in part of the Sandjaks of Afiun, Karahissar, and Kutshia, which will be determined when the accord becomes definite, as well as in the coal basin of Heraclea, so far as the above-mentioned should not be directly given by the Ottoman Government to Ottoman subjects with Ottoman capital.

2. When the concessions contain privileges or monopoly, they shall be exploited by societies formed according to Ottoman law.

3. Ottoman capital shall be assisted as largely as possible with Italian capital. Ottoman participation may reach 50 per cent of the total.

4. The Royal Government of Italy pledges itself *to support effectively* in relation to its Allies *all demands of the Turkish delegation relative to the Peace Treaty, and especially restitution to Turkey of Smyrna and Thrace.*

5. This part of the agreement involves the withdrawal of Italian troops which still remain in Ottoman territory" (c).

6. The foregoing disposition will come into effect as a result of a convention to

(a) Due, to some extent, as already indicated, to the substitution at Athens (December 1920) of Constantine for Venizelos; and in the case of Italy, to the occupation of Smyrna by Greece.

(b) Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 84; *Round Table*, December 1922, pp. 8-10. *Current History*, October 1922, pp. 34-5. The United Kingdom was not being harassed in this way. The Greeks were defending the British occupation of Ismid.

(c) The Italians withdrew immediately: *Ann. Reg.*, 1921. p. 221.

be concluded between the two contracting parties immediately after the conclusion of peace assuring Turkey a free and independent existence" (a)

When presenting this document to the Italian parliament, Count Sforza, the Italian representative on the Supreme Council, said (*Italics now added*):—

"I desired to reach an agreement with the Turkish delegates on our own economic action in Anatolia and the Heraclea mining basin, and it was understood that *the policy of the Italian Government was to proceed in perfect harmony and co-operation with the Turkish authorities*. I was able, happily, to conclude an agreement, signed on the evening of March 12, by which a vast zone in Asia Minor is open specially to Italian economic penetration without any political aims, and I have secured the sincere and cordial co-operation of Turkey, which is convinced of the honest and loyal intentions of Italy" (b).

The principal points for observation are: (1) Italy withdrew her claim to any part of Turkish territory; (2) she withdrew her troops from Turkish territory; and (3) she promised to support

"all demands of the Turkish delegation relative to the Peace Treaty, and especially restitution to Turkey of Smyrna and Thrace."

The "demands" were those of the Angora Pact above referred to.

The French agreement with Bekir Samy Bey (9 March) was not approved by the Angora government, and never became operative. Further negotiations resulted in the treaty of 20 October 1921 (c). It provided for cessation of hostilities; for exchange of prisoners (d); for a cession by France of a part of the territory over which she was arranging for a mandate; for withdrawal of French troops; for arrangements with reference to the Bagdad railway, etc. France made no claim to any part of Turkish territory except Syria. From that time, she favored and to some extent assisted the Turks (e).

To this treaty Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, took exception upon a variety of grounds. In a speech of 24 November, he said:—

"Much more important than the victory of either party is that there shall be no victory, but that there shall be peace. This will never be arrived at if any Power tries to steal a march on others and to conclude independent reforms on its own account. Such plans take us to a blind alley and find us landed in a cul-de-sac, unless all the great Powers come together in perfect loyalty and bend their shoulders to the common task" (f).

(a) It may be seen in *Current History*, May 1921, p. 203. And see *Contemporary Review*, May 1921, p. 676.

(b) *Current History*, May 1921, p. 203.

(c) *Current History*, January 1922, p. 660. The treaty is referred to in Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 54, 95.

(d) M. Franklin Bouillon, representing France, signed the treaty on behalf of France at Angora, and arranged the exchanges before returning to Paris—so he informed a correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*. See the weekly edition of 6 October 1922.

(e) *Current History*, October 1922, p. 35.

(f) *Current History*, January 1922, p. 661.

Speaking in the French Senate, M. Briand, the French Premier, threw the blame upon British policy. He said (*Italics now added*)—

"It was a duty of loyalty to remember that we had allies, to do nothing calculated to break our word to them and to prejudice the general interests of the alliance. This we tried to do. In London we attempted to deal with the whole question. *It was not our fault if the attempt did not succeed.* More recently, in Paris, on the initiative of Lord Curzon, who was also anxious to restore peace in the East, we renewed the attempt. *Again it did not succeed.*"

France, he added, could not continue to exhaust herself in war with the Turks.

"The agreement has been signed We are no longer at war in the East." (a).

Of the various objections specified by Curzon in the correspondence which ensued between the governments (b), the only one that need here be mentioned is his reference to the agreement as a bargain between Paris and Angora, by which France was, at the general peace conference, to endeavor to solve, in a manner favorable to Turkey, all questions relative to Turkish sovereignty and independence, in consideration of the grant to France and French nationals of a number of economic concessions and other advantages. These two matters did appear (in unrelated form) in a letter which the Turkish representative had addressed to the French representative during the negotiations (10 October), but the French Minister explained that the only reply to the letter was a mere acknowledgment of its receipt, and he denied the existence of any impropriety. There was, however, a later letter—one sent by the French to the Turkish representative contemporaneously with the signature of the treaty (20 October) which ran as follows (*Italics now added*):—

"I fully share your hope that the agreement concluded between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey with a view to effect a definite and durable peace will result in the re-establishment and consolidation of the close relations which have existed in the past between the two nations, *the Government of the French Republic making effort to settle, in a spirit of cordial agreement, all questions relating to the independence and sovereignty of Turkey*" (c).

Couched in diplomatic phraseology, the bargain is there. France had agreed, as had Italy, to uphold diplomatically the independence and integrity of Turkey (d). For these reasons, the peace proposals above referred to, of March 1921 and March 1922, must be regarded, not as the terms which France and Italy were willing to offer Turkey, but as

(a) *Ibid.*

(b) *British White Paper, Turkey, No. 2, 1921, and No. 1, 1922, Cmd. 1570; Current History, April 1922, p. 58.* And see *Contemporary Review, June 1922, p. 707.*

(c) *Cmd. 1570 (1922), pp. 41-2.*

(d) Were Canada to undertake to "defend the Treaty of Sevres," she might meet with opposition from two of the three Allied Powers who signed it—indeed, from all three of them.

the extent to which the United Kingdom could be persuaded to concur in the views of her two allies (a).

THE GEORGE-CHURCHILL MANIFESTO:—To the bungling which had characterized every step in the treatment of Turkish affairs, the climax was still wanting. The British government had manoeuvred itself into a difficult and dangerous situation. Refusing to agree with its Allies in adoption of a policy which, while reducing the extent of purposed imperialistic annexations, would render future peace possible, the government had found itself isolated. France and Italy, forecasting more correctly the future, had come to agreement with Turkey, while the British government, having in view the impossible project of the establishment of a Gibraltar at Gallipoli, was still pro-Greek. Unable (for various reasons) actively and effectively to supply their protégés with effective military assistance, the government, to its dismay, saw the Greek army overwhelmed and, having opened a way of escape across the Straits for a section of it, saw the pursuing Turks approach, intent upon driving the Greeks from Eastern Thrace, of which the coveted Gallipoli was a part. What would the British government do? Would they drop their impracticable purpose? Or would they precipitate, or at least risk, war with Turkey, and probably Russia, by an attempt to attain their end? They did both — the latter first and shortly afterwards, the former.

The Allies, in May 1921, had declared that certain areas on either side of the Straits should be regarded as neutral zones, and had requested the belligerents (Greeks and Turks) to govern themselves accordingly. The advance of the Turks, therefore, raised a question for inter-Allied consideration. But, without a word of consultation with either France or Italy, and, still more amazing, as Mr. Bonar Law has said:—
“with the knowledge of only three or four of the cabinet. . . . none of the others knew anything about it” (b).

(Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, knew nothing of it), Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill issued the following alarming and inflammatory manifesto (The running comments are mine):—

“In the view of his Majesty’s Government, the approach of the Kemalists to Constantinople and the Dardanelles and the demands put forward by the Angora Government have clearly created a situation which has been continuously under the attention of his Majesty’s Ministers during the last week. These demands, if assented to, involve nothing less than the entire loss of the whole results of the victory over Turkey in the late war.”

(Within twenty-four days after the publication of this document, the only Kemalists demand to which Mr. Lloyd George was making opposition

(a) Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

(b) Speech in London, 7 Nov. 1922: *The Citizen* (Ottawa) 8 Nov. 1922.

—namely the Turkish claim to Eastern Thrace—was conceded by the Mudania armistice).

“The channel of deep salt water that separates Europe from Asia and unites the Mediterranean and the Black Sea affects world interests, European interests, and British interests of the first order. The British Government regard the effective and permanent freedom of the Straits as a vital necessity, for the sake of which they are prepared to make exertions. They have learnt with great satisfaction that in this respect their views are shared by France and Italy, the other two Powers principally concerned.”

(The “freedom of the Straits” was not in issue. Acceptance of the proposal by the Turks had several times been announced.)

“The question of Constantinople stands somewhat differently. For more than two years it has been decided that the Turks should not be deprived of Constantinople, and in January of last year, at a conference in London, the representatives of the Constantinople and Angora Turkish Government were informed of the intention of the Allies to restore Constantinople to the Turks, subject to other matters being satisfactorily adjusted.”

The wish of the British Government is that a conference should be held as speedily as possible in any place generally acceptable to the other Powers involved, at which a resolute and sustained effort should be made to secure a stable peace with Turkey. But such a conference cannot embark upon its labors, still less carry them through with the slightest prospect of success, while there is any question of the Kemalist forces attacking the neutral zones by which Constantinople and the Dardanelles are now protected.”

(The Turks did not propose attacking these places. They wished merely to cross the Dardanelles in order to complete the war [which Greece had commenced] by turning the Greeks out of Eastern Thrace. Evacuation without war having been afterwards arranged by the Allies, the crisis terminated, and the conference at Lausanne embarked peacefully upon its labors).

“The British and French Governments have instructed their High Commissioners at Constantinople to notify Mustapha Kemal and the Angora Government that these neutral zones established under the flags of the three Great Powers must be respected.”

(That was not the fact. France and Italy had joined in a request, but had purposely refrained from saying “must” (a). Upon learning of the issue of the manifesto, they immediately withdrew their troops from the south side of the Dardanelles.)

(a) In his Manchester speech of 14 October last, Mr. Lloyd George said that the French had agreed that invasion of the neutral zone “would be resisted by force by the Allies.” That was not correct. In his Birmingham speech of 13 October last, Mr. Chamberlain quoted the letter from the French government (14 September). It was as follows: “That the Government of the Republic is in agreement with His Majesty’s Government that it is desirable, without prejudice to the provisions of the future treaty of peace, to maintain the neutrality of the zones actually occupied by the Allies in the region of Constantinople and the Straits. The French Government is ready to join the British and Italian Governments in informing the Government of Angora that the allied Governments feel sure that this zone will be respected by its troops” (*The Globe*, Toronto, 14 October 1922). That was all that Mr. Lloyd George could point to as warranting his Manchester assertion.

"However, it would be futile and dangerous, in view of the excited mood and extravagant claims of the Kemalists, to trust simply to diplomatic action. Adequate forces must be available to guard the freedom of the Straits and defend the deep-water line between Europe and Asia against a violent and hostile Turkish aggression.

That the Allies should be driven out of Constantinople by the forces of Mustapha Kemal would be an event of the most disastrous character, producing, no doubt, far-reaching reactions throughout all Moslem countries, and not only through all Moslem countries, but throughout all the States defeated in the late war, who would be profoundly encouraged by the spectacle of the undreamed of successes that have attended the efforts of the comparatively weak Turkish forces. Moreover, the reappearance of the victorious Turk on the European shore would provoke a situation of the gravest character throughout the Balkans, and very likely lead to bloodshed on a large scale in regions already cruelly devastated."

(Within twenty-four days, as above mentioned, Mr. Lloyd George agreed to the restoration of Eastern Thrace to the Turks and all the dangers disappeared).

"It is the duty of the Allies of the late war to prevent this great danger and to secure the orderly and peaceful conditions in and around the Straits which will allow a conference to conduct its deliberations with dignity and efficiency, and so alone reach a permanent settlement."

(The one pre-requisite for "orderly and peaceful conditions" was that, instead of issuing the document under review, Mr. Lloyd George should have announced his willingness to agree to the arrangements which, twenty-four days afterwards, at Mudania, he accepted):—

"His Majesty's Government are prepared to bear their part in this matter, and to make every possible effort for a satisfactory solution. They have addressed themselves in this sense to the other Great Powers with whom they have been acting, and who jointly with them are associated in the defence of Constantinople and the neutral zone."

(These Powers, as Lord Curzon could have told Mr. Lloyd George, would certainly decline the invitation. And they did).

"It is clear, however, that the other Ally Powers of the Balkan Peninsula are also deeply and vitally affected. Rumania was brought to her ruin in the Great War by the strangulation of the Straits. The union of Bulgaria and Turkey would be productive of deadly consequences to Serbia in particular and to Jugo-Slavia as a whole. The whole trade of the Danube flowing into the Black Sea is likewise subject to strangulation if the Straits are closed."

(Within twenty-four days, the juxtaposition of Bulgaria and Turkey was agreed to).

"The engagement of Greek interests in these issues is also self-evident. His Majesty's Government are, therefore, addressing themselves to all these three Balkan Powers with a view to their taking a part in the effective defence of the neutral zones."

(Rumania and Jugo-Slavia declined. Proposal of Greek co-operation gave support to the assertion that Mr. Lloyd George's purpose was not so much to prevent the Turks crossing their own water as to protect the Greeks in Eastern Thrace).

"His Majesty's Government have also communicated with the Dominions, placing them in possession of the facts, and inviting them to be represented by contingents in the defence of interests for which they have already made enormous sacrifices, and of soil which is hallowed by immortal memories of the Anzacs."

(The invitation will be subsequently dealt with. The hallowed soil was the peninsula of Gallipoli. Note that on this 16th September, Mr. Lloyd George proposed to keep the Turks out of it—with a view to the establishment of his Gibraltar there. It is part of Eastern Thrace, and was included in the surrender to the Turks of twenty-four days afterwards at Mudania).

"It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to reinforce immediately, and if necessary to a considerable extent, the troops at the disposal of Sir Charles Harington, the Allied Commander-in-Chief at Constantinople.

Orders have been given to the British Fleet in the Mediterranean to oppose by every means any infraction of the neutral zones by the Turks, or any attempt by them to cross to the European shore." (*The Times*, 18 September 1922).

Doubts having reasonably been raised as to the authenticity of this manifesto, a further document was issued on the 19th, as follows:—

"It is stated in some newspapers that the semi-official declaration of policy issued to the press Saturday is now regarded as mistaken by the Government. This statement is untrue. The declaration of policy given to the press Saturday reported the decisions of the cabinet of the previous day, and was issued with the approval of all the Ministers in London, in order that public opinion throughout the Empire should be left in no doubt regarding the aims and intentions of the British Government on the question of Imperial policy to which the support of the Dominions had been invited by telegram."

Speaking in London on 7 October, Mr. Bonar Law said:—

"When I read that manifesto, I thought, and I said to a friend, 'It is utterly impossible that this or any government should have made such an appeal without previous confidential correspondence with the Prime Ministers of the Dominions.' What was my amazement to find in a few days that not only was there no such consultation with the Dominions, but that this extraordinary manifesto had been issued with the knowledge of only three or four of the cabinet, and that none of the others knew anything about it. Just consider what appeal to the Dominions meant. The whole relationship of our Empire is one of the most solemn things in connection with our whole social and political life. I believe I am right in saying that never in our history up to now had we made an appeal to the Dominions for help, but that the offers of help have come invariably from the Dominions without an appeal from us. To suddenly throw, as a bolt from the blue, this appeal for help when not one of the Dominions had the remotest idea that there was any need of it, and when it was well known that their help could not come in time to be of any assistance in the crisis, was to risk, in my opinion one of the greatest assets of the Empire." "It was to take a risk with our Dominions, which no wise man would have taken, and which I think was not more foolish than it was wrong" (a).

I hope that imperialistically inclined Canadians will fully appreciate

(a) *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 October 1922.

the honor of being an "asset" which may be lost if not handled diplomatically.

Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, was not one of the "three or four of the cabinet" who were consulted. He has declared that he read the manifesto in the newspapers next morning "with consternation," and that it was issued on the responsibility of only two or three ministers (a). We know two of them—Lloyd George and the belligerent Winston Churchill (b), who signed the cables to the Dominions.

A few days after issue of the second of the manifestoes, Reuter's Agency reported the following interview with Mr. Lloyd George:—

"The Premier said that the cabinet felt that the sacrifices which Australia and New Zealand had made in Gallipoli in the great war entitled them to be consulted when the question of the freedom of the Dardanelles Straits was involved. The cabinet decided, therefore, that those Dominions were entitled to participate in the defence of the freedom of the straits; and the cabinet, at the same time, felt that it was impossible to ask these two Dominions to take part in the defence without inviting the remainder of the Dominions. Thus Canada and South Africa were also approached" (c).

It was thought that we might be peeved by being left out of a war. Perhaps our Premier might deem it advisable to intimate to Mr. Lloyd George's successor that we trust he will not be so fastidiously considerate of our supposed susceptibilities. As to the pretence of Australia and New Zealand being "entitled to be consulted when the question of the freedom of the Dardanelles Straits was involved," it may be noted that they were not at Lausanne.

CANADIAN ACTION:—On receipt of the message (d), our government asked permission to publish it. Leave was refused, but sanction was given, it is said, to publication of the substance of it. Making unsatisfactory use of this permission, the government issued the following:—

(a) Out of the conflicting statements of Winston Churchill and Lord Curzon published in the *Manchester Guardian* of 10 November last, and of the former in the issue of the next day, we may gather that the policy of opposing the advance of the Turks was agreed to at a cabinet meeting, at which Curzon was present, on Friday 15 September; that at the same time it was declared (to quote Churchill) "that the Dominions were to be informed of the situation and invited to send aid if need arose"; that on the same evening cables were sent to the Dominions—Curzon approving their form; that the manifesto was drafted the next morning by Churchill and submitted to Lloyd George, who (Churchill said) "consulted with such colleagues as available"; that Curzon had gone to the country, and, although in telephonic communication with Lloyd George, was not consulted; that no one at the Foreign Office was communicated with; and that "on Sunday morning" (as Curzon said) he "read with consternation the manifesto in the press."

(b) Mr. Churchill's influence in the cabinet is said to have been second only to that of Mr. Lloyd George. If there were two others, they were probably Mr. Chamberlain, and Lord Birkenhead. See *The Times*, 10 October 1922.

(c) *Ottawa Journal*, 23 September 1922.

(d) Not only was Canada not consulted beforehand, but, with marked discourtesy, announcement of the invitation to us was made in London prior to its arrival at Ottawa: *Canadian Gazette*, London, 12 October 1922. In the issue of 26 October was the following: "Mr. King, it is understood, strongly objected to the Note inviting Canadian participation in the protection of the Straits being communicated to the Press before it reached the Government here, and a message was promptly despatched to Mr. Lloyd George inquiring why the substance of a communication marked 'secret and confidential' should have appeared in the newspapers twelve hours before it reached the Canadian Government. To this, it is believed, there has been no reply."

"This official message is a statement of the action taken by the British Cabinet on September 15, and it asks whether the Dominion government wishes to associate itself with the action the Imperial Government is taking—whether Canadians would desire to be represented by a contingent" (a).

What the "action" was, was not stated, and nobody, outside the government knew. A further statement by the government was as follows:—

"As already mentioned, the only communication which our government has thus far received, with respect to the situation in the Near East, from the British government, is a cable despatch marked 'secret', the contents of which, without the sanction of the British government, we do not feel at liberty to make public.

"It is the view of the government that public opinion in Canada would demand authorization on the part of parliament as a necessary preliminary to the despatch of any contingent to participate in the conflict in the Near East.

"The government is in communication with members of the cabinet at present in Europe as Canada's representatives at the League of Nations, and with the British government with a view to ascertaining whether the situation in the Near East is one which would justify the summoning of a special session of parliament."

The extent to which Canada was really interested in the squabble may be judged from the fact that, although we were invited to send a military contingent to fight the Turks, we were not invited to attend the conference at Lausanne at which any existing difficulties were to be discussed and, if possible, settled.

EFFECT IN FRANCE AND ITALY:—The effect in France and Italy of the issue of the George-Churchill manifesto without consultation with them was evidently a surprise to its authors, although, probably, exactly as Lord Curzon (better informed) would have anticipated. *The Times* of the 18th September reported as follows:—

"In the afternoon meeting (yesterday) Ministers had before them a diplomatic remonstrance from France upon the semi-official statement, and its enunciation of an apparently bellicose policy, without previous consultation with the French government."

France regarded the statement as provocative of war, pointing particularly to the British invitation to Greece (with whom Kemal was at war) to co-operate with British troops (b) and, to mark her disapprobation of the proposed war-measures she, immediately (18 September) withdrew her troops from the south side of the Dardanelles. Italy did the like. A telegram from Paris of the 19th was as follows:—

"The French Cabinet to-day unanimously approved what is characterized as the 'pacific' policy of Premier Poincaré in the Near East and the withdrawal of all the French troops from Asia Minor to the French side of the Straits of the Dardanelles.

(a) That the message was intended to be an invitation, is proved by the two documents (above quoted) issued by the British government; and by the statement of Mr. Churchill in the *Manchester Guardian*, quoted ante, p. note. Mr. Hughes, the Australian Premier, so interpreted it. *The Times* (London) reported parts of his speech in parliament on 22 September as follows: "The Prime Minister laid emphasis on the fact, as of the utmost importance, that what Mr. Lloyd George had asked Australia to do was to join with the other Dominions and the Allies to maintain the *status quo*", etc.

(b) *The Times*. 18 and 19 September.

The Cabinet went firmly on record as being opposed to any form of military action as a means of settlement in the Turco-Greek situation. It emphasized the necessity of reaching an agreement through diplomatic channels and eventually by a peace conference.

The order for the withdrawal of the French forces from Chanak in the Dardanelles area was sent late last night by Premier Poincaré, and will be carried out to-night or to-morrow. Meantime the French High Commissioner, General Pelle, has been sent to Smyrna to confer with Mustapha Kemal Pasha, inform him that France does not approve the 'belligerent' attitude of the British Government, and that she intends to confine her efforts to the diplomatic field, it is stated."

THE PARIS CONFERENCE:—Hoping to undo the mischief that had been done by the publication of the manifesto, Lord Curzon went to Paris for conference with Poincaré and Sforza, the Italian representative. The only question for determination was the disposition to be made of Eastern Thrace. Was peace to be secured by assigning it to Turkey? As early as March 1921, France and Italy had agreed with Kemal (as we have seen) that it was to be Turkish. The policy of the United Kingdom, as indicated in the peace-proposals of March 1922, was to give the eastern part of it to Turkey and the western (including Gallipoli) to Greece. Kemal was demanding immediate possession of the whole of it (a)—wished to get it peaceably and, failing agreement, intended to take it by force. What was to be done?

Since the issue of the manifesto of the 16th, Mr. Lloyd George had become painfully aware of the extreme difficulty of maintaining his truculent attitude. The Labor party had sent a deputation to tell him of their determined opposition to engulfment in another war. The government of India had, some months previously, reported "the intensity of feeling in India," and had urged "restoration of the Turks in Thrace, also in Adrianople and Smyrna," and it now reported the views of "leading Moslems" and the proposal to form an "Angora Legion" to go to the assistance of the Turks (b). The appeal to Rumania and Jugo-Slavia had failed. The appeal to Canada and South Africa had failed. All the Dominions had joined in a telegram from Geneva urging the British government to refer the whole matter to the League of Nations (c). And in sharp disagreement with British action, France and Italy (as already stated) had withdrawn their forces.

Notwithstanding all this, Lord Curzon (whether under direction from Lloyd George, or not, we do not yet know) maintained a stiff attitude during the first three days of his visit. A telegram of 22 Sep-

(a) *The Times*, 23 September. And see post, pp. 53-5.

(b) *Toronto Globe*, 22 September.

(c) They had supported Dr. Nansen's motion to that effect, and had met with opposition from Lord Balfour and the French and Italian representatives.

tember from the correspondent of *The Times* (London) in Paris was (in part) as follows (Italics now added):—

“From a French source I have received a highly important statement to the effect that while the French Prime Minister is convinced that there will be a peaceful settlement, there is considerable difference of opinion between the British and the French respecting the terms of invitation. It is then probable that three separate Notes will be drawn up and sent tomorrow. *France will insert in her Note the promise that Turkey will obtain her legitimate demands, while the British Note will omit such phrases.* Italy, not desirous of signing a joint Note if this divergence persists, will on her side draw up a third form of invitation. The Turks are in accord as to the control of the Straits.”

Referring to the proposed note to Kemal, the correspondent said:—

“Asked if there would be included any of the proposed conditions of peace, Lord Curzon stated that it was impossible thus to anticipate officially the decisions of the conference itself. In the conversations with M. Poincaré and Count Sforza, the British Foreign Minister is understood to have made it clear that, although he was prepared to exchange views on the future conditions of peace, he did not desire to take any steps which would prejudice the conference which it is hoped will be held. To draw up a veritable treaty would be premature, and would be usurping the functions of the assembly in which the voices of all the Powers concerned should be equal. *It was, in his opinion, important to refrain from framing definite resolutions and from attempting to impose on the Balkan Powers the preliminary and tentative decisions of the three Western Powers.* M. Poincaré pointed out that it was necessary to notify the Turks that their reasonable claims would be accorded. As it was of vital importance that there should be no hostile action taken by the Turks pending these deliberations, at least some fair assurances should be put before them.”

A telegram from Paris on the 23rd September indicated that Lord Curzon was maintaining his uncompromising attitude.

“Lord Curzon stands firmly against allowing the Turks to cross Thrace now, and the British Government are by no means willing to promise that the Turks eventually will have Eastern Thrace. It is on the question of Thrace that the most important differences among the Allies hinge. Lord Curzon notified Poincaré and Sforza to-day” (the 22nd) “that the British intended to stay in Chanak on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles” (a).

France and Italy were willing that the Turks should have Eastern Thrace without further delay. Lord Curzon, on the other hand, would make no commitments prior to the meeting of the peace conference. The same indisposition obtained in London, where the government, in a communiqué, after reference to the neutralization and free navigation of the Straits, stated that:—

“All other matters at issue are secondary and subject to peaceful accommodation between Turkey and the states most directly concerned” (b).

In other words, nothing would be said meanwhile about Eastern Thrace.

(a) *Toronto Globe*, 23 September.
 (b) *Ottawa Journal*, 23 September.

From this position Lord Curzon at length withdrew, so far as to agree that, at the peace conference, the United Kingdom would support the claim of Turkey to Eastern Thrace—not that the Turks were to have it now, and not that they were to have a guarantee that they should get it, but merely that they should have a promise of diplomatic support at a subsequent conference. The proposal was put in the form of a note (signed by Curzon, Poincaré, and Sforza) to the Angora government (23 September) in which was said that:—

“the three governments take this opportunity to declare that they view with favor the desire of Turkey to recover Thrace as far as the river Maritza and including Adrianople.”

(the Maritza separates Eastern from Western Thrace); promised that, upon condition of abstention from force movements, they would

‘willingly support, at the Conference, attribution of these frontiers to Turkey;’

stipulated that steps should be

“taken in common agreement to assure effectually, under the League of Nations, maintenance of the freedom of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus, as well as protection of religious and racial minorities”;

and agreed to support the admission of Turkey to the League of Nations (a). This document contained the surrender of three fourths of the Lloyd George policy which had created and was continuing the crisis. A French representative, M. Franklin-Bouillon, entrusted with the delivery of the note to Kemal, and with instructions to endeavor to procure its acceptance, left Paris on the 25th.

KEMAL'S ATTITUDE:—Kemal's attitude with reference to the Paris proposal was made perfectly clear. On the 29th September, Dr. Reshad Bey, as representative of the Angora government, after an interview with Lord Curzon in London, gave to *The Times* a statement of its effect in which he said (among other things) that (*Italics now added*) “from the very beginning Turkey accepted the freedom of the Straits. I suggested to Lord Curzon that the immediate evacuation of Thrace should be secured, with the installation of Turkish administration in that province under the supervision of Allied officers, with a view to calming Turkish apprehensions and to allaying anxiety in Great Britain in regard to any alleged outrages. *I assured him this would be enough for the solution of the crisis, and for the overcoming of danger*” (b).

In other words, Kemal was not satisfied with a promise of support at the peace conference, which would not meet for weeks and might continue for months. By that time his military superiority might have disappeared; Greece might have found allies; and new conditions might

(a) The text of the note may be seen in *Current History*, Nov. 1922, p. 187.

(b) *The Times*, 3 October 1922.

have afforded ground for non-fulfillment of promises. And so the question was reduced to this single point—Would Mr. Lloyd George advance another step? Would he agree that Turkey was to have Eastern Thrace *now*? (a). If so, he was assured that that “would be enough for the solution of the crisis.”

Meanwhile his political position had undergone still further deterioration. Public opinion had become more distinctly adverse. The staid and influential *Spectator* had declared that:—

“Lloyd George has turned our foreign policy inside out, and made a mess of it.”

And the leaders of the opposition—Asquith, Grey, Crewe, Gladstone, and MacLean—had joined in a note condemnatory of action separate from France and Italy, and declaring their refusal to support it (b). What now would Lloyd George do?

THE MUDANIA ARMISTICE:—Danger of military collision being imminent, the Allied Commissioners at Constantinople proposed (25 September) a meeting at Mudania for the purpose of endeavoring to arrange an armistice. In its reply, the Angora government accepted the invitation but, making its position absolutely clear, reiterated the statement of Dr. Reshad Bey by declaring that:—

“since to keep Thrace, if only for a single day more, under the administration of the Greek army of occupation, is the cause of a variety of dangers and of suffering to the Turkish population, *it is indispensable to evacuate the Greeks immediately as a matter of urgency, and to restore Thrace to the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey as far as the West of Maritza, including Adrianople*” (c).

At Constantinople the same attitude was announced. A telegram from there of 2 October to *The Manitoba Free Press* and *The New York Times* was as follows (Italics now added):—

“Anyhow, Mustapha Kemal’s representative says that the National Assembly is practically unanimous on the subject of the peace counter-proposals, demanding as a preliminary the evacuation of Thrace by the Greeks and its occupation by a Nationalist force. *If the Allies are disinclined to undertake the ejection of the Greeks, then the Kemalists consider that the British, who now bar the way, should stand aside and permit the Nationalists to invade Thrace and try conclusions with the Greek army.*”

On 4 October, *The Times* said editorially (Italics now added):—

“From statements which our Correspondent has received from a trustworthy source, we learn that *the immediate evacuation of the Greeks from Eastern Thrace and the re-establishment there of a Turkish civil administration of a local character, with an Ottoman gendarmerie*, are held by Angora to be the essential preliminaries to all further

(a) *Current History*, Nov. 1922, p. 190.

(b) *Round Table*, Dec. 1922, pp. 17–18.; *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 6 October 1922; *Ottawa Journal*, 3 October 1922.

(c) *The Times* (London), 2 October 1922.

negotiations. They will not object, it is believed, to the presence of Allied troops until the district is finally handed over; nor will they even insist upon the earlier admission of Turkish troops."

On the other hand, on the same day it was announced in *The Times* that:—

"The British position is that the joint Allied note to Turkey remains the unalterable basis of our policy in the Near East."

In other words, the question of the ownership of Eastern Thrace must remain unsettled until the meeting of the peace conference. No agreement upon this fundamental point being possible at Mudania, the delegates adjourned on 5 October, and Sir Charles Harrington returned to Constantinople and telegraphed London for instructions.

ANOTHER PARIS CONFERENCE:—Hurried cabinets in the middle of the night (5th-6th) and the next morning (6th) resulted in Lord Curzon leaving in the afternoon for Paris, *The Times* saying (Italics now added):—

"Lord Curzon's mission is a great importance. It is understood to have been prompted by the need of ascertaining, without delay, whether or not the French Government adhere fully to the terms of the joint Allied Note of September 23 to the Angora Government.....Should the French Government be unable to support the terms of the Allied Note, which make the occupation of Eastern Thrace by the Turks contingent upon the conclusion of peace, it is to be feared that British and French policy may in future follow divergent paths" (a).

Observe that the above-quoted documents make perfectly clear that the point in dispute was simply whether Eastern Thrace was to be evacuated by the Greeks and handed over to the civil administration of the Turks, supported by Turkish gendarmerie, *before or after the conclusion of peace*. Only with the greatest difficulty and after "some vigorous exchanges," (Curzon taking one view and Poincaré and Sforza the other) was agreement in Paris arrived at (b). The formula arranged was a complete submission to Kemal's demands. It was as follows:—

"The three Allied Governments are in accord in declaring that the Greek troops should be invited to withdraw as early as possible to the west of the Maritza (this is understood to mean in the space of nine or ten days). In the territories thus evacuated the Allied Governments shall assure, by means of a provisional inter-Allied occupation, the maintenance of order and of security until the establishment in Thrace of a civil Turkish administration and of a Turkish gendarmerie. This establishment shall be effected in a space of time not exceeding one month after the evacuation of the Greek troops. At the expiration of that period the Allied troops will only continue to occupy during the Conference certain points on the right bank of the Maritza and the regions where they are at this moment" (c).

(a) *The Times*, 7 October.

(b) *The Times*, 9 October 1922.

(c) *Ibid.*

Respecting this document, *The Times* Paris correspondent said:—

“Obviously, these arrangements, which will provide the basis of negotiations at Mudania, do not differ materially from the Turkish demands, and they are considered to be in full conformity with Allied interests and dignity” (a).

Commenting on the formula, the Constantinople correspondent of *The Times* said:—

“It remains to be seen whether Ismet Pasha will accept these further concessions. He has now obtained 90 per cent. of what he demanded from the Allied Generals” (b).

Difficulty arose, however, between the Allies, as to interpretation of the language of the formula. The instructions sent from London to Sir Charles Harington were to the effect that (*Italics now added*):—

“the Foreign Office agreed to the occupation of Thrace by Turkish gendarmerie one month after the Greek evacuation on condition that *the number of gendarmes were limited*, and that Turks evacuated and respected the neutral zone;”

while the French instructions (*Italics now added*):—

“provided for the occupation of Thrace by *such a force of Turkish gendarmerie as was deemed sufficient by the Turkish Nationalist Government*, on condition that the Turks evacuated and respected the neutral zone as it may hereafter be defined by the Generals at the Mudania conference” (c).

Prior to the arrival of further and concordant instructions, the gendarmerie question was at Mudania

“the chief bone of contention. The Allied position is that not more than 2,000 gendarmes are necessary. The Turks make the claim for several times that number. The Allies are determined to prevent the Turks from using the Thracian gendarmerie as a threat to force the British out of Constantinople, prior to the final peace, it is learned” (d).

How that question was settled appears in the armistice agreement signed at Mudania on 10 October, the principal clauses of which, for present purposes, are as follows:—

- “1. That the Greek evacuation of Thrace shall be carried out within about 15 days.
2. That the Greek civil authorities, including the gendarmerie, shall be withdrawn as soon as possible.
3. That as the Greek authorities withdraw, the civil powers will be handed over to the Allied authorities, who will transmit them to the Turkish authorities on the same day.
4. That this transfer shall be wholly concluded throughout Eastern Thrace within a minimum period of 30 days after the evacuation of the Greek troops has been concluded.

(a) *Ibid.*

(b) *Ibid.*

(c) *The Times*, 10 October 1922.

(d) *The New York Times*, 10 October 1922.

5. That the civil authorities of the Angora Government shall be accompanied by such forces of the Nationalist gendarmerie as strictly necessary for the maintenance of law, order and local security. The total strength of these officers and men shall be left to the discretion of the Nationalists, subject to approval by the Allies" (a).

6 and 7. Allied commissions and contingents for the purpose of maintaining order during the transfer.

"8. That the withdrawal of the inter-allied missions and contingents will occur in 30 days after the completion of the evacuation of the Greek forces. This evacuation may occur earlier, provided the allied governments are agreed adequate provision has been made for the maintenance of law, order, and the protection of the non-Turkish population. If the Turkish gendarmerie functions normally, the inter-allied missions and contingents may be withdrawn before the expirations of thirty days."

9, 10, 11, 12. Respect by the Turks of the neutral zones.

With the signature of this agreement on 10 October, the crisis created by the George-Churchill manifesto of 16 September ended. The demand of the Turks had been conceded.

FREEDOM OF THE STRAITS. (b)

We must now try to understand, first, the history of what has so frequently been referred to as "the freedom of the Straits;" secondly, what Mr. Lloyd George meant by the maintenance of it; and thirdly, what relation it had to the recent crisis—Mr. Lloyd George has, several times, referred to it as one of the reasons for his actions.

Originally a Mohammedan lake, a *mare clausum*, upon which Turkish ships alone might sail, the Black Sea became (primarily by Russian insistence), with reference to commercial ships, a *mare liberum*—by passage through the Straits being accorded to vessels of all nations. For many years past there has been, upon that score, no difficulty save during periods of war (c). The passage of war-vessels during peace, on the other hand, has been a matter of quarrel. Prior to 1914, the policy of the United Kingdom had been directed to keeping the Straits closed, and, by various treaties, she had succeeded in establishing closure as a generally recognized principle. Article 2 of the first of these—the treaty of Constantinople, 1809—was couched in language regardful of Turkish susceptibilities:

"As it has at all times been forbidden for vessels of war to enter into the canal of Constantinople, that is, into the Straits of the Dardanelles and into that of the Black Sea, and as that ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire should be observed henceforth in times of peace with reference to any Powers whatsoever, the Court of Britain promises also to conform to this principle".

(a) By verbal understanding, the number was not to exceed 8,000: *The Round Table*, December 1922, p. 17; *Current History*, November 1922, p. 192.

(b) A useful review of this subject may be seen in *International Conciliation*, No. 180.

(c) International Law now acknowledges the right of friendly nations to pass their commercial vessels through straits within the territorial limits of other nations.

By the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (8 July 1831), Russia secured the promise of Turkey that the Straits were to be open to Russian warships exclusively. But the agreement was short-lived. The other Powers intervened and, by the treaty of 1841, between the United Kingdom, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Turkey, "the ancient rule" was revived "as long as the Porte is at peace, His Highness will admit no foreign ships of war into the said Straits".

That was a severe blow to Russia. The treaty inhibition affected her alone. For practically no other Power ever desired, during peace, to send its warships through the Straits. Historians agree that:— "the germ of the Crimean war may, in a sense, be found in the convention of the Straits" (a).

At the end of that war, the United Kingdom and France insisted upon continuation of the previous prohibition—to the exclusion of all warships during peace. Article 10 of the peace treaty so provided. From this prohibition Russia has always wanted to be released. In 1908 (because of previous establishment of *entente* relations), the United Kingdom was apparently willing to agree that the warships of all the Powers fronting on the Black Sea should be permitted to pass, during periods of peace (b), but troubles over Bosnia and Herzegovina interrupted the negotiations. When, in 1912, Russia renewed her request for the concession (c), Sir Edward Grey declared that the time was not opportune (d).

No treaties relate to the passage of warships, in time of war, through the Straits. They have been open when Turkey so desired, and closed when her interests so required. During the Napoleonic wars, Russian ships passed freely, while French were excluded. During the Crimean war, British and French ships passed as they pleased, while Russian were excluded. In 1878, as a threat against Russia (then menacing Constantinople), the British fleet passed the Dardanelles, and remained for some months in the Sea of Marmora. In 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war, but while Turkey was at peace, three Russian vessels of the volunteer fleet of potential cruisers passed the Straits, but afterwards submitted to British protest. During the Turco-Italian war of 1911-12, Turkey, apprehensive of attack, closed the Straits altogether, but, on international remonstrance, opened them to neutral commercial shipping. And during the great war of 1914-18, the Straits were closed

(a) Skrine: *The Expansion of Russia*, p. 139; quoted in Hassall: *History of British Foreign Policy*, p. 260.

(b) See the despatches in Siebert and Schreiner collection, pp. 220, 322, 414, 416, 427.

(c) *Ibid.*, pp. 415-7.

(d) *Ibid.*, pp. 417-8.

until the defeat of Turkey. What Turkey has in this respect always done, every nation having the power will always do. No treaty-promises will induce one belligerent to supply assistance to the enemy (a).

The situation in 1914 being as above described, it is mere falsehood to declare, as Mr. Chamberlain did in his Birmingham speech of 13 October last, that preservation of

“That freedom of the narrow Straits which was our primary object in the war with Turkey.”

On the contrary, the greatest effort was made, in 1914, to induce Turkey to co-operate with the Entente Allies, by the promise of a guarantee of Turkey's integrity and independence (including Turkish control of the Straits); and it was only because Turkey, under German influence, made war upon Russia, that the United Kingdom declared war against Turkey. The United Kingdom at that time was *opposed* to “the freedom of the Straits.” Furthermore, during the war, the United Kingdom made an agreement with Russia (March 1915) by which Constantinople and large territories in its vicinity (including the control of the Straits) were to be Russian (b). Perhaps during periods of fierce political-party struggle, a little latitude must be allowed to the participants, but there ought to be some limitation.

WHAT MR. LLOYD GEORGE MEANT—After the defeat of Turkey (1918) British ideas as to passage through the Straits took new and surprising form. The proposals for peace drafted by the Allies at Sevres (10 August 1920) contained the following clause—

“*Article 37.* The navigation of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus, shall in future be open, both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or of war and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag.

If, up to that time, the United Kingdom had been the principal objector to the passage of non-Turkish warships through the Straits, even in time of peace, why was it that in 1920 she desired that all foreign warships should be given free passage during both war and peace? The answer is that she desired it in conjunction—and only in conjunction—with another change, namely, that the United Kingdom should be substituted for Turkey in the power to *close* the Straits during war. It is clear that what Mr. Lloyd George at first meant by “the freedom of the Straits” was that, by military occupation of the peninsula of Gallipoli and the demilitarization of the opposite shore, the United

(a) Exposition of “the freedom of the Straits” may be seen in the *North American Review*, December, 1922, p. 721; *Nineteenth Century*, November 1922, p. 843; and *Fortnightly Review*, November 1922, p. 272.

(b) F. Seymour Cocks: *The Secret Treaties*, pp. 15–25.

Kingdom was to be in a position to close the Straits whenever war probability or pendency made the closing advisable. He wanted a British Gibraltar on the peninsula of Gallipoli. He wanted access, at all times, for the British fleet, to Constantinople and the Black Sea, with all the military advantage over Turkey, Russia, and the other sea-abutting states which that would give him. During the recent crisis, he made very clear what he meant, for, finding himself in control, he, although representing a neutral state, permitted his friends, the retreating Greeks, to cross from Asia to Thrace (a), and refused to allow the Turks—the owners of the Straits—to do the like in pursuit (b). That France and Italy, who were in joint control with the United Kingdom, refused to concur in that view of “the freedom of the Straits” was immaterial. Mr. Lloyd George had his own purposes in view, and he determined to act alone.

A GALLIPOLI GIBRALTAR:—The effort to substitute the United Kingdom for Turkey commenced with a clause in the Sevres peace-proposals as follows:—

“*Article 178.* For the purpose of guaranteeing the freedom of the Straits, the High Contracting Powers agree to the following provisions:—

“(4) The said Powers, acting in concert, shall have the right to maintain in the said territories and islands such military and air forces as they may consider necessary to prevent any action being taken or prepared which might directly or indirectly prejudice the freedom of the Straits.”

While in the peace proposals of March 1922, many concessions to Turkey were made the clause just quoted was developed into the following (*Italics now added*):—

“The interests of peace and the safety of the future demand that Europe shall never again be exposed to the perils and sacrifices which were imposed upon her in 1914 and the succeeding years by the forcible closure of the Dardanelles. The countless lives that were there poured out, the stupendous efforts that were entailed, must not have been expended in vain. The Turks will be readmitted to the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles under conditions which will provide for the existence of a broad demilitarized zone in order to obviate the possibility of any hostile military preparations in that quarter. *But an Allied force must be placed, and must remain, in occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to safeguard the free and unimpeded entrance of the Straits.* This will also be a demilitarized zone. The Allied garrison will consist of a force sufficient to secure the entrance to the Dardanelles.

This was a purely British scheme. France and Italy, twelve months previously, had (as we have seen) agreed to protect Turkey diplomatically from all such designs (c). It was an amazingly audacious idea. It

(a) *Round Table*, December 1922, p. 12.

(b) A further illustration of Mr. Lloyd George's view of “the freedom of the Straits” was furnished by his permission to Greek warships to pass into the Black Sea in order to bombard Angoran ports and villages and to sink Turkish vessels, while refusing to permit the Turks to attack the Greeks in Thrace: *The Fortnightly Review*, December 1922, p. 905.

(c) And they ran no risk in joining in the proposal. France was in close touch with Kemal Pasha through Franklin-Bouillon, and was well aware that it would be rejected.

meant, not that the Straits would remain open during war, but that the power to *close* them would be transferred from Turkey to the United Kingdom. It meant the dissipation of all hope of peace until such arrangements were ended.

RETREAT:—The British government found that the scheme could not be successfully accomplished, and, during Lord Curzon's visit to Paris of 20-24 September (above referred to) it underwent material modification. A telegram from Paris on the day of his arrival indicated that the situation was as follows:—

“The two Ministers were in agreement on the necessity of maintaining the freedom of the Straits, although it is understood there may be some difference of opinion as to the character of the control to be exercised” (a).

The Gibraltar scheme had to be dropped, and, with his usual dexterity, Mr. Lloyd George, the next day, in an address to a deputation from the Labor party, stated that the government's policy was somewhat in accordance with the telegram of the Dominions from Geneva—namely, “maintenance of the freedom of the Straits, under control of the League of Nations.” Even that control would be useless, he declared, “unless an adequate force was planted there by the League to see that the Straits were kept neutralized.”

The report of the meeting continues:—

“Asked whether freedom of the Straits meant fortifications in the hands of some international body, the Premier replied that that would be for the League to decide. He also admitted that there should be no interference with the Straits, either by Great Britain or any other nation, otherwise that is not internationalization” (b).

A telegram from London on 10 October reports Mr. Lloyd George as giving his definition of “the freedom of the Straits” as:—

“that the Straits should be just like any other international waterway, that they should be free for the vessels of any nation to pass to and fro to the Black Sea without interference, and that there should be a guarantee in the form of control by the League of Nations.”

The Gallipoli-Gibraltar project had fallen through. Neither at the Mudania armistice-conference, nor at the Lausanne peace-conference was the slightest attempt made to realize it.

TURKS ASSENT TO “THE FREEDOM OF THE STRAITS”:—When Mr. Lloyd George referred to “the freedom of the straits” as one reason for his war-attitude, he knew perfectly well that the Turks had, on several

(a) *Ottawa Journal*, 20 September.

(b) *Manitoba Free Press*, 10 October.

occasions, expressed their assent to it—that is, in principle. The only questions were (1) what the phrase meant, and (2) how best and on what conditions it could be secured. Observe the following:—

(1) On 18 December 1919 the Turkish National Government at Angora formulated the Angora Pact, the fourth clause of which was as quoted on a previous page.

(2) Clause 5 of a treaty entered into on 16 March 1921 between Turkey and Russia is as follows:—

“In order to guarantee the freedom of the Straits and of the commercial traffic through them of all countries, each of the contracting parties agrees to entrust the final elaboration of international regulations governing the Black Sea and the Straits to a special conference of the adjacent States, provided always its decisions do not infringe the full sovereignty of Turkey, or the security of Turkey or its capital, Constantinople” (a).

(3) Mustapha Rechid Pasha, a Turkish Minister at London, in an interview (15 September 1922) with a reporter of the *Manchester Guardian*, when stating the terms which Turkey demanded, said:—

“We have declared, over and over again, that we admit the principle of the liberty of the Straits. Consequently, on the basis of the principle, Turkey can enter into negotiations with the Powers on this question.”

(4) The Rt. Hon. Ameer Ali, a member of the British Privy Council, in a letter to *The Times*, said as follows, 19 September:—

“On the 18th there appeared in the Press a manifesto by the Government which is nothing less than a call to arms for the settlement of a question regarding which there is no dispute. The Nationalist Turks have distinctly intimated that they have no desire or intention to interfere with its freedom, and expressed their willingness that its control should be entrusted to an International Commission. This being the case, and the League of Nations in full session at Geneva, one wonders what this beating of drums is intended to signify.”

(5) An interview with Kemal (25 September) by the *Manchester Guardian* contained the following:—

“Turkey is ready to give every reasonable guarantee assuring the freedom of the Straits to all Nationalities, if the interested Powers in their turn guarantee the safety of the Turkish capital—Constantinople and the Sea of Marmora” (b).

(6) A telegram from Constantinople, 25 September was as follows:

“Regarding the Straits, we have already admitted freedom for the passage of all vessels through the Dardanelles, but we are not prepared to define under what

(a) From the text issued 20 September 1922 by Soviet Russian Trade Delegation in London: *The Times*, 21 September.

(b) Issue 29 September, of *Weekly*.

authority or body the control shall be vested. That question must be settled by conference between the Turks and the Allies." (a).

(7) Kemal's reply (received in London 5 October to the note of the Allies, contained the following:—

"There is no disagreement in principle regarding the freedom of the Straits, in order to secure the safety of Constantinople and the Sea of Marmora, and the safeguarding of minorities within the limits compatible either with the independence or the sovereignty of Turkey, exigencies of an effective settlement in the Near East"(b).

(8) In an address to the National Assembly at Angora on 5 October, Kemal said:—

"The National Government was among the first to recognize the freedom of the Straits, and we have no intention of violating the principle."

In view of all this, it is very clear that assertion that prohibition of access of the Turks to Thrace was necessary in order to secure "the freedom of the Straits" was audaciously dishonest. When the peace-conference met at Lausanne the Turks acted in accordance with their previous declarations.

RELATION OF THE FREEDOM TO THE CRISIS:—But we must understand more clearly the relation of Mr. Lloyd George's proposed "freedom of the Straits" to the crisis. From one point of view, there was no relation—the Turks were willing to agree to "the freedom," and to negotiations as to the method of establishing it. But to Mr. Lloyd George, the method was the one point of importance, namely, that the United Kingdom should be in control, and that "the freedom" was to be such only as the United Kingdom should, during war, be willing to permit. That was a position, however, which could not be secured by negotiation unbacked by arguments of coercive character. If at the proposed peace-treaty meeting, Mr. Lloyd George could say to Turkey: "You may have Eastern Thrace provided you agree to British occupation of Gallipoli," he would have been in an infinitely stronger position than if, prior to the meeting, Turkey had been admitted to occupation of the territory. For that reason, he first refused to say anything at all about Thrace until the meeting and not until apprehensive of lack of support did he agree that at the meeting he would support Kemal's demand. Even from that precarious negotiation-advantage, he finally receded, and agreed to the immediate installation of Turkey. The British thereby lost an important argument of coercive character. There were others which would have been made use of had not the whole scheme been dropped.

(a) *Ottawa Journal*, 23 September.

(b) *New York Times*, 3 October.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S REASONS FOR HIS WAR-ATTITUDE.

THREE REASONS:—In his Manchester speech of 14 October, Mr. Lloyd George offered three reasons for his war-attitude. One of them—"the freedom of the Straits"—has just been dealt with. The second alleged reason was "to prevent war spreading into Europe." By substituting "Europe" for *Eastern Thrace*, Mr. Lloyd George wished to revive memories of the Hindenburg and other war-lines of by-gone and anxious days. Thrace is on the shores of the Marmora and the Dardanelles. It is on the southeast fringe of Europe. And, moreover, the way to prevent the spreading of the war into Thrace was to arrange that the Greeks should withdraw. A few days after alarming the world with his fiery-cross cables, that is what Mr. Lloyd George did. The third alleged reason (in one speech incorporated with the second) was

"to prevent a repetition in Constantinople and Thrace of the scenes of intolerable horror which have been enacted in Asia Minor during the last six or seven years."

But Kemal was in no way threatening an attack upon Constantinople, and, once more, the way to prevent the horrible repetition was to arrange that the Greeks should withdraw. That is what was done. The whole cause of the trouble was that it was not done sooner—that Mr. Lloyd George's surrender came in parts, and much too slowly.

If, moreover, Mr. Lloyd George had been arguing for the complete exclusion of the Turks from Constantinople and Thrace, his reference to Turkish cruelties would have had some relevancy (although why he should have sought to place the equally cruel Greeks in large areas predominantly non-Greek, would require explanation); but there could be no point in it after he had agreed, at Mudania, that the Greek forces must leave Thrace within fifteen days, and that the transfer to the Turks of the civil administration should be concluded

"within a minimum period of thirty days after the evacuation of the Greek troops had been concluded."

In view of his previous attitude—his declaration about "intolerable horror" if the Turks entered Thrace—it must have been extremely difficult for Mr. Lloyd George to agree that the Turks should, almost immediately, take possession of the place. For a man of less courage, repetition of his reason for keeping them out would have been impossible.

AN OIL REASON:—It has been asserted that the basic reason for the despatch of troops into Mesopotamia during the war was the desire to obtain possession of the prolific oil fields of Mosul; and that the

retention of control there (under guise of a mandate and a treaty with King Feisal—a British puppet) has its warrant in the same aspiration. Upon these points, I am not in a position to offer opinion. This much, however, is certain: Acquisition of oil-producing territory was and is a matter of important British interest; that fact could not have been absent from the minds of the British government when planning the expedition; they were well aware that possession of the Mosul district would be a factor—perhaps a controlling consideration—when, at a peace conference with Turkey, the ownership would be settled; and they knew that not only between the United Kingdom and Turkey, but in competition of British with foreign concession-exploiters, possession would be useful. It is not, therefore, unfair to assume that one reason for Mr. Lloyd George's refusals to sanction the return of Eastern Thrace to Turkey was that he might have in it wherewith to bargain for control of Mosul. Those who followed the proceedings at Lausanne easily can see that in surrendering Eastern Thrace at Mudania a bargaining advantage of conspicuous utility was relinquished.

VALUE OF THE REASONS:—These being the reasons alleged for precipitating the crisis, with the possibility of precipitating war, the answer to the question whether Canada ought to have declared herself to be willing to embark upon military struggle with Turkey, is not difficult. Why should she?

To assist in "the establishment of a Gibraltar at Gallipoli?" No. That was impracticable and inadvisable. The British government itself abandoned the scheme at Mudania, twenty-four days after the issue of the George-Churchill manifesto. At Lausanne all that was said about it was that it was abandoned.

To prevent the war spreading into Europe? To prevent a repetition there of the recent horrors in Asia? No. The way to prevent these things was to arrange that the Greeks should withdraw from Eastern Thrace. Twenty-four days afterwards that was done.

To furnish the British government with a bargain-factor wherewith they might realize their Gibraltar-Gallipoli scheme, or secure advantages with reference to the Mosul oil fields? No. Assuredly no. These are not objects for which Canada would be willing to sacrifice her sons.

CONDEMNATION:—The above recital makes amply clear why it was that the Lloyd George-Winston Churchill conduct of Near East affairs has been so generally, so heartily, and so justly condemned.

For the partition treaties of 1915-16, the preceding government (of Mr. Asquith) was responsible. Mr. Lloyd George had been a member of that too, and Mr. Winston Churchill had been a member until 11 November 1915; but upon them rests no special responsibility for the aggrandizing arrangements of those sordid documents. Since the Turkish armistice, however, they, principally, must bear the blame for the blunders which successively crowded one upon the other. Observe the following:

1. The Turks having been defeated, and their army, in pursuance of the armistice agreement, having been demobilized (a), the Allies were in position to dictate provisions requisite for the establishment of future tranquillity. To that end they did nothing. Instead, they sent the Greeks to renew the war, with the results that we know, and that might have been anticipated—the only parts of Turkey which had previously escaped the ravages of war devastated; mutual massacres; mutual pillagings; mutual atrocities such as had always characterized hostilities between the mutually hating Greek and Turk.

2. And all that for what reason? That the Greeks might be repaid for previous war-assistance? That the Greeks might establish their permanent rule over millions of Turks? That the voracious imperialisms of Greeks and Allies might be satisfied or, at least to some extent, assuaged? That the United Kingdom might establish control over Turkey and the Black Sea littoral by erection of a Gibraltar at Gallipoli? Whatever the motive, there was not in it the slightest semblance of mitigation or palliation of the infinitely hideous crime of setting at one another's throats two nations who would certainly not only kill each other's fighting soldiery, but would burn, and pillage, and rape, and lay waste after the manner of barbarians or savages. For one woman or child destroyed in that hellish war, what excuse can George-Churchill supply? By sanctioning the Greek attack, they doomed thousands. Men who set two roosters fighting are justly sent to jail.

3. Argument to prove the absurdities of the peace proposals of Sevres is unnecessary. No one would now offer a word in their defence. The personal influence of Venizelos over Lloyd George may partially explain the character of the document.

4. Argument to prove these absurdities is unnecessary, for the eviction of Venizelos from Athens and the return of Constantine to his throne (circumstances which ought to have had no effect whatever upon the disposition to be made of Turkish territory) led to a recasting of

(a) Less than 20,000 effectives, scattered over the whole territory, remained: Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p.226.

the Sevres proposals in March 1921, upon somewhat more defensible lines.

5. Proof that the document so revised was still absurdly unreasonable is unnecessary, for, contemporaneously with it, France and Italy made separate arrangements with Turkey upon acceptable lines.

6. Argument upon that point is unnecessary for the further reason that, in March 1922, the revision of 1921 was, in its turn, recast by all three allies, and rendered more defensible.

7. Argument to prove that this later revision was still unreasonable is unnecessary, for that has been made obvious by the terms of the Mudania armistice and the proceedings of the Lausanne peace conference. If anyone wishes to obtain an idea of the vagaries, the ineptitudes, the absurdities of British policy, let him consider the imperilments of the secret treaties of the war period (a); the Sevres partition demands of August 1920 (b); the diminished proposals of March 1921 (c); the astonishing attenuations of March 1922 (d); the stubborn refusal, even at the risk of war, to accept the necessary implication of the surrenders (e); the abandonment of the Gibraltar-Gallipoli scheme (f); and the final submission to the demands of Turkey (a defeated nation) for the evacuation by the Greeks of Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, and the return to Turkish sovereignty of almost the whole area in dispute.

8. The George-Churchill manifesto of 16 September last, issued without the sanction of the cabinet, without the knowledge of the Foreign Secretary, without consultation with either France or Italy, was an audacious attempt to bring to realization the scheme for a British Gibraltar on the peninsula of Gallipoli—to preserve Eastern Thrace from the Turks as a bargain-factor for service at the peace conference.

9. The attempt met with derisive failure. France and Italy not only refused to co-operate, but withdrew their forces from Chanak. Roumania and Jugo-Slavia declined to assist. Canada and South Africa sent dilatory replies to invitations for contingents. Home opinion was openly adverse.

10. Retreat commenced. Lord Curzon agreed (at Paris, 23 September) that he would support the Turks' claim to Eastern Thrace at the peace conference.

11. The Turks having declined to wait, the retreat continued. At Mudania the British government agreed that the Greeks were to

(a) Ante, pp. 29-31.
(b) Ante, pp. 37-8.

(c) Ante, p. 40.
(d) Ante, p. 40.

(e) Ante, pp. 45-57
(f) Ante, p. 61.

withdraw from Eastern Thrace *within fifteen days*, and that the Turks should be installed, with ample gendarmerie, within thirty more.

12. One reason dishonestly assigned for the George-Churchill manifesto was the necessity for keeping the Turks from following the Greeks into Thrace. But that could have been achieved, and twenty-four days afterwards was accomplished by providing for the peaceful evacuation by the Greeks.

13. A second dishonest reason was the alleged necessity for keeping the Turks out of Constantinople. But as early as the Sevres proposal, the Allies had agreed that the Turks should, at the peace conference, be restored to their capital; and Kemal was not proposing military occupation prior to that date. All that he was asking was immediate possession of Eastern Thrace, where, he said, his people were suffering grievously at the hands of the Greeks.

14. The third dishonest reason was the alleged necessity for preservation of the freedom of the Straits. Theretofore, the United Kingdom had always *opposed* opening the Straits to war-vessels. The change of desire originated in connection with the establishment of a British Gibraltar at Gallipoli—of British control of the Straits. And the Turks, while opposed to the Gibraltar, had declared themselves in favor of the proposed freedom. The only questions for discussion were (1) what exactly was to be the scope of the freedom, and (2) by what sanction was it to be secured.

15. The crisis inaugurated by the manifesto terminated with the George-Churchill surrender of their attitude with reference to Eastern Thrace. No discussion as to "the freedom of the Straits" was necessary. And none took place.

16. Canada had no interest and took no part in all these schemings and intrigues. She had no share in responsibility for sending the Greeks to attack the Turks, and in the horrible slaughterings and bevilments which followed. Although her representative signed the Sevres proposals, she had no share in the preparation of the document. Her signature was a matter of formal acquiescence, and her legislation of complacent concurrence. She was not consulted with reference to the revisions of it either in March 1921, or in March 1922. She was not invited to discuss it, or these, at the peace conference at Lausanne. The George-Churchill manifesto came to her as a perfect surprise. Canada is fortunate and happy in the conviction that her only connection with the whole episode was her refusal to agree to join in a Turkish war

without the assent of her parliament. It is probable that that action may have had some influence in turning George and Churchill from further pursuit of their imperialistic purposes.

BRITISH FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSULTATION

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1921. Attempts are sometimes made (usually dishonestly) to lessen the shame of a merely bull-terrier attitude on the part of Canada by alleging that British foreign policy is conducted in consultation with the Dominions. Nothing could be farther from the truth. For not only is there (save at Quadrennial Imperial Conferences) no pretence of such practice, but, admittedly, it is impossible that the British Foreign Secretary should be hampered in his work by the necessity for seeking advice in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa as to what, from hour to hour, he should do. To those who do not agree with me, I say look at the report of the proceedings of the last Imperial Conference. There you may read:

"In this context, very careful consideration was given to the means of circulating information to the Dominion Governments and keeping them in continuous touch with the conduct of foreign relations by the British Government" (a).

In his opening speech, Mr. Lloyd George referred to "circulating information" (not asking or wanting advice) as follows:—

"The direct communication between Prime Ministers, established during the war, has, I think, worked well; and we have endeavored to keep you thoroughly abreast of all important developments in foreign affairs by special messages sent out weekly, or even more frequently when circumstances required. Indeed, at every important Conference, either here or on the Continent, one of the first duties I felt I ought to discharge was to send as full, and as complete, and as accurate an account as I possibly could, not merely of the decisions taken, but of the atmosphere which counts for so very much. I have invariably, to the best of my ability, sent accounts, some of them of the most confidential character, which would give to the Dominions even the impressions which we formed, and which gave you information beyond what we could possibly communicate to the press" (b).

That was a very exaggerated picture of what had really happened, and Mr. Hughes (Premier of Australia) corrected it by saying:—

"You yourself said yesterday, Sir, that direct communication between the Prime Minister of Great Britain and his colleagues had worked well. So it has; that is to say, the principle has worked well; but I think I ought to tell you, Sir, that it is rarely that one does not read in the newspapers, sometimes a day, sometimes more than a day, before receiving your telegrams, a very good imitation of their substance" (c).

The ignorance which the Dominion Premiers displayed at the Conference furnished the best evidence of the meagreness of the in-

(a) Report, p. 3.

(b) *Ibid.*, p. 14.

(c) *Ibid.*, p. 19.

formation with which they had been supplied. For although Mr. Lloyd George's opening speech contained nothing but what had appeared in the English newspapers, the Dominion Premiers received it as an exposition of something quite new. Mr. Meighen, for example, said:—

"The information that the Prime Minister has given as to the progress of peace negotiations, or rather the re-establishment of actual peace upon the basis of the peace treaties, is indeed encouraging. I feared myself that he would not be able to make quite so gratifying a report" (a).

Mr. Hughes said:—

"I desire to congratulate you upon the admirable review of the position that you presented to us yesterday. I am sure it was most valuable, as well as most interesting" (b).

Indeed, Mr. Hughes had been ignorant not only of what had happened, but of the reasons for the policy which had been pursued for more than two years. He said:—

"We are now asked to deal with foreign policy, and in order that we may do this, you have said that Lord Curzon would review the present position of foreign affairs. We shall await that statement with great interest. The whole Empire is concerned in foreign policy, though this was regarded for many years as the sole prerogative of Great Britain. Wars are hatched by foreign policy. No one is able to say that any act affecting foreign nations will not, in the fullness of time, lead to war. No one is able to say that the most apparently trivial and innocent action will not involve us in international turmoil, and in the fullness of time bring us to the bloody plains of war. So when we see on every side the British line—or, if you like, the line of this Commonwealth of British nations—being lengthened and the line of defence necessarily thinned, the points of potential danger multiplied—we are naturally uneasy. We have seen that a cloud no bigger than a man's hand can cover the whole heavens. And so, Sir,—I speak only for myself, of course—I am sure you will quite understand our desire to know the reasons for your policy in Mesopotamia, in Palestine, in Russia, in Egypt, and your policy in Greece and Turkey. If I have singled these things out, it is not because they cover the whole field of foreign policy, but because these matters are perhaps the most obvious. Now if we are to have an effective voice in the foreign policy of this country, we must first of all know precisely how we stand, and the reasons for the policy adopted, and the extent to which we are committed to it" (c).

What had been the British Government's attitude even toward the United States was not known to the Premiers. General Smuts said:—

"Since the war we have somewhat drifted apart. I need not go into the story—I do not know the whole story—It is only known to you here" (d).

So much for the past. As to the future, Mr. Hughes said:—

"But the position in regard to policy in the future is very difficult. Every day a new situation arises, or may arise. How is it to be dealt with? We shall be scattered to the four quarters of the earth. How are the Dominions to have an effective voice on foreign policy when, as things stand, they can only be told after things have been done, and are not consulted beforehand?" (e).

(a) *Ibid.*, p. 16

(b) *Ibid.*, p. 17.

(c) *Ibid.*, p. 18.

(d) *Ibid.*, p. 24.

(e) *Ibid.*, p. 19.

To that there was, of course, no reply. Indeed, the impossibility of carrying on foreign affairs by consultation with Dominion Premiers was affirmed by Mr. Lloyd George in his speech of 18 August 1921—immediately after the close of the Conference. He then said that Prime Ministers might communicate with one another, but

“Communications by cable are not a means by which you can have real consultation, because you may have a particular point of view, and may alter it after hearing what is to be said on the other side” (a).

Lord Milner was of the same opinion. He said:—

“But experience has shown that the consultation which is necessary in order to keep the different interests of the Empire in line cannot be properly effected by telegrams and despatches, between half a dozen different Governments” (b).

The result, then, is, as the report of the Conference stated, that:—
“the whole weight of the Empire” is to be “concentrated behind a united understanding and common action in foreign affairs” (c),

but that there are no means by which “a united understanding” can from time to time be reached. Sir Wilfrid Laurier always refused to engage in consultation as to foreign affairs. He declared that consultation meant responsibility, which he declined to incur.

OTTAWA JOURNAL AND TORONTO GLOBE:—The impossibility of conducting foreign affairs by cable-consultation is well recognized in Canada. For example, the *Ottawa Journal* said:—

“The decision of the British Foreign Office, a branch of the British Government, which is responsible to the electorate alone, must be final. Let us suppose, for example, that a difficulty suddenly arises between the British Government and France. It is an emergency, demanding rapid decision. Does any sane person suppose that the Foreign Office, compelled to act in haste, will sit idly with hands folded until it has the advice of all the Dominions, thousands of miles away, and without the information necessary to form an intelligent judgment? The proposition, of course, is preposterous! In such a case, and in all similar cases, we should have no voice, even though the decision taken involved the Empire in war.”

The same may be said with reference to difficulties which, as the *Toronto Globe* very well put it (13 September 1917), are

“the culmination of a long train of events and tendencies, diplomatic intercourse, public opinion, and sentiment.”

These develop slowly, and the more slowly they develop, the more impossible is it that the Foreign Office can effectively consult the Dominion Premiers. Despatches must be written; instructions must be sent to the Ambassadors; imperceptibly the breach widens; at no point, least of all toward the last, can the Foreign Office submit its action for revision, criticism, or even effective suggestion.

(a) *The Times*, 19 August 1921.
(b) *The Times*, 21 July 1921.
(c) P. 3.

CONSULTATION AT CONFERENCES:—Even at Conferences there can be little that could be termed *consultation* upon foreign policy over the whole world. If the premiers know enough to follow intelligently what is said to them, that is all that can be expected of them. Possibly they may, upon occasion, believe that they can contribute something to the formation of policy, but, in reality, they are merely given to believe that their counsel is of importance. For example, Mr. Hughes, on his return to Australia, said, in his House of Assembly, as to the difficulties in Upper Silesia:

“The matter was dealt with by the Conference as one at once vital and most urgent, and a policy was unanimously decided upon” (a).

But in the official report of the Conference it is stated that:—

“The main lines of British policy in connection with the solution of this problem received the unanimous approval of the Conference.”

BRITISH POLICY IN TURKEY:—Further, it must be noted that a policy which may be approved on one day may on the morrow stand much in need of revision. Observe, for example, the progress of events in the Near East. An armistice agreement between the Allies and Turkey was signed at Mudros on 30 October 1918. On 10 August 1920, the Allies submitted to Turkey and Greece proposals (signed at Sevres) for a peace treaty (b). Not having been ratified, amendments were proposed in March 1921. These having been refused by Greece, fighting between Turkey and Greece proceeded. That was the situation during the sittings of the Imperial Conference. What did the Conference do? Nothing—as far as we have been permitted to know. If anything was agreed to, it was useless, for shortly afterwards (20 October 1921), because of a French separate treaty with Turkey, the situation underwent material change; the relations between the United Kingdom and France became strained; and unpleasant letters passed between the two Foreign Offices. In the following March a new set of proposals was submitted to the belligerents. This time Turkey refused acceptance. Fighting proceeded, and, by the extrusion of the Greeks from Asia Minor, the situation assumed another and a very delicate appearance. Then came the amazing George-Churchill manifesto of 16 September last; the invitation to the Dominions to send contingents to Asia Minor; Lord Curzon’s hurried visit to Paris (18 September), where he made three quarters of his surrender to Turkish demands; Turkish insistence upon the other quarter; Curzon’s second visit to Paris (6 October), where the surrender was completed; and the ending of the crisis at Mudania (10 October).

(a) *Hansard*, 11634

(b) Referred to ante, pp. 37-40.

For how much of all this blundering was Canada responsible? To what extent was she consulted? The answer is that she had as much to do with it as had the youngest baby at Moose Lake, Moose Jaw, Moose Factory, or any other Moose or mossy spot—not more. And yet, to support it, she was invited to send a contingent beyond the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

BRITISH POLICY IN EGYPT:—History of recent events in Egypt furnishes another example of what must always be the negligible influence of the infrequent meetings of prime ministers. During the great war, the United Kingdom had assumed to terminate Turkish sovereignty over Egypt, and to declare that the land of the Pharaohs should be regarded as a British protectorate. After the armistice of November 1918, the Egyptian Nationalists, under the leadership of Zaghlul Pasha, demanded independence. In March 1919, Zaghlul and three others were arrested and sent to Malta. That being recognized as a mistake, they were next month released. Then a commission was appointed, with Lord Milner as chairman, to investigate conditions and to make recommendations. Boycotted in Egypt, the commission pursued its work in London (June-August 1920); negotiated there with Zaghlul; made some progress (a); submitted a first report (18 August); resumed meetings with Zaghlul in October-November; on 6 November published a Memorandum (b); and on 20 December issued its final report.

With the Milner recommendations, the British government (chiefly, one may say, Winston Churchill and Lord Curzon) disagreed, and requested Adly Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister, to come to London for consultation. He was there during the sittings of the Imperial Conference (June-August 1921) the report of which has the following:—

“Close consideration was given to the question of British policy in Egypt and the future status of that country, and general agreement was reached regarding the principles by which His Majesty’s Government should be guided in the negotiations with the Egyptian delegation.”

The principles were bad, and had to be abandoned. Meanwhile, however, Curzon handed to Adly a draft of the British proposals, which, declaring a willingness to terminate the protectorate and

“To recognize Egypt as a Sovereign State under a constitutional Monarchy,” provided in many forms for political subordination—differing in that regard, to some extent, from the Milner recommendations. An important point, in Curzon’s view, was that the protectorate should be terminated only as the result of a bargain. The first clause of his draft was as follows:—

(a) *Annual Register*, 1920, pp. 96, 285.

(b) *Ibid.*, pp. 83-6.

"The Government of his Britannic Majesty agree, in consideration of the conclusion and ratification of the present Treaty, to terminate the Protectorate declared over Egypt on December 18, 1914, and thenceforth to recognize Egypt as a Sovereign State under a constitutional monarchy."

Provision of that sort would have enabled the British government, at any future time, to withdraw the recognition of independence, upon failure of compliance by Egypt with some clause of the treaty. Adly wanted elevation to the status of an independent Power first, and then a treaty of alliance between the two Powers.

EGYPTIAN OBJECTION:—The Egyptian delegation replied to Lord Curzon in a document stating some grounds for rejection of the British proposals. To the military provision, the objection was that it

"constitutes occupation pure and simple, destroys every idea of independence, and suppresses even internal sovereignty."

Adly objected, also, to British control of foreign relations; to the power of a proposed British High Commissioner to require the Egyptian government "to submit to his direct control in the conduct of foreign affairs;" to a British resident with the title of "High Commissioner" (requiring merely the sending of a diplomatic representative); to the British government taking charge of negotiations for the termination of the capitulations; to the presence and interference of British Financial and Judicial Advisers; to

"interference going so far in certain cases, as regards the Financial Adviser, as to constitute a check on the Government and Parliament;"

to the proposals with reference to the Soudan:—

"which do not guarantee to Egypt the exercise of her indisputable right of sovereignty over that country, and of control of the waters of the Nile."

The delegation pointed out that the draft proposals had "the quality of an actual deed of guardianship"—a deed which would "constitute for one of them a permanent pact of subjection, "instead of being, as anticipated, a "treaty of alliance." Finally, it declared that the proposals did:—

"not allow us to retain the hope of arriving at an agreement which will give satisfaction to the national aspirations of Egypt."

EFFECT IN EGYPT:—All hope of agreement having been destroyed, Adly Pasha returned to Egypt (8 December) and resigned his premiership (accepted on the 24th). No successor to Adly could be found, even among the Moderates. Allenby ruled alone with the help of martial law. He did not like it, but Curzon had made any other method impossible.

ALLENBY AND CURZON:—On 6 December, Allenby sent a long telegram declaring that

“no signed agreement was practicable unless his Majesty’s Government were prepared to accord to Egypt a higher degree of independence than they were clearly disposed to grant. . . . I quite appreciate that the action I advocate would oblige his Majesty’s Government to terminate the Protectorate by a unilateral declaration on their part.”

On the 8th December, Lord Curzon replied that the proposal could not be entertained. On the 11th, Allenby repeated his views, saying:—

“I must ask your Lordship and his Majesty’s Government to believe me when I state the fact that no Egyptain, no matter what his personal opinions may be, can sign any instrument which in his view is incompatible with complete independence. Consequently it is necessary to abandon definitely the idea that the Egyptian question can be settled by means of a treaty.”

In reply to this, Lord Curzon said:—

“It is necessary, in order to obviate any misunderstanding, to recall explicitly that no ‘undertaking’ has been given by his Majesty’s Government to abolish the Protectorate and to recognize Egypt as a Sovereign State. His Majesty’s Government only offered to adopt this course as part of a bargain, which was rejected by the other party.”

Meanwhile, opposition to the British proposals became so demonstrative that Zaghlul was arrested (21 December) and transported to the Seychelles. The arrest was followed by boycott and other demonstrations. Something had to be done, and on the 28th January, Allenby was called to London, where he arrived on the 10th February. Two days previously, Lloyd George had referred to the matter in the House of Commons, and had said:—

“We are willing to meet all the legitimate national aspirations of the Egyptian people. We are prepared to abandon the Protectorate, but it must be on clear, fundamental conditions.”

That was a re-affirmation of the Curzon policy as approved by the Imperial Conference—*independence as the result of a bargain*. Seven days after Lloyd George spoke, it was abandoned.

Lord Allenby had his first interview with Curzon in the evening of his arrival. On the 13th, he had an interview with Lloyd George; and on the 15th, he had two interviews with both men, when an agreement was reached. It was all that Allenby had desired. The independence of Egypt was to be acknowledged by the British government, not on conditions, fundamental or otherwise, but voluntarily. Subsequent negotiations were to take place upon four points:—

“(a) Security of the British Empire communications; (b) defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression and interference, direct or indirect; (c) protection of

foreign interests in Egypt and protection of minorities; (d) guarantees for British interests in the Soudan."

That there may be no question that the change in policy above indicated actually took place, the following excerpt from a speech by Mr. Austen Chamberlain may be quoted:—

"The policy which the Government were pursuing was one for the conclusion of a treaty between Egypt and this country which would lay the basis for the abolition of the Protectorate, for the independence of the Egyptians in their own affairs, and at the same time give us guarantees which were essential to the discharge of our obligations to Europe, for the protection of British interests in Egypt, and for the security of the vital communications of the Empire. The policy of everyone was to secure such a treaty. But no Egyptian Government—and for this the Zaghlul agitation was largely responsible—dared to make a treaty giving us those essential securities. Accordingly, when the negotiations with Adly had broken down and he resigned, Lord Allenby proposed that we should give up the idea of a treaty and act by way of a unilateral declaration. That was the policy which the Government ultimately adopted" (a).

Allenby's return to Cairo was an occasion of great rejoicing. A Ministry was at once formed under Sarwat Pasha, and on the 6th March a Ministerial Council was held at which, for the first time on record since 1883, the British Financial adviser was not present. Afterwards, the Sultan was proclaimed King.

From this recital, it is plain that the policy which the Imperial Conference agreed to was that which the British government had endeavored to press upon Adly Pasha; that it was a complete failure; that it led to the resignation of the Egyptian ministry, and the impossibility of forming another; that, in the words of Adly Pasha, it "failed to satisfy the national aspirations of Egypt;" that, principally through the influence of Lord Allenby, the Curzon policy (b) was abandoned and new arrangements, satisfactory to Egypt, were made.

And it may safely be added that Canada was not consulted with reference to the change of policy; that our government knew nothing of the Allenby conversations in London; and that an expression of opinion on any of the reserved points has not been asked. Nevertheless, Lloyd George, in explaining to the House of Commons (31 March) the effect of the settlement, said:—

"The declaration conforms closely to the policy laid down by the agreement at the Imperial Conference, and fully covers all matters there defined as essential to Imperial security."

That is not true. The incident, therefore, is one which well illustrates the impossibility of conducting foreign policy by quadrennial meetings of prime ministers in London or by cable communications.

(a) *The Times*, 15 March 1922.

(b) Probably the abandoned policy ought to be ascribed to Winston Churchill rather than to Lord Curzon.

BRITISH GOVERNMENTS AND BRITISH FOREIGN
MINISTERS.

CHANGING POLICIES:—It must not be overlooked that if Canada is to hold herself responsible for the effects of British foreign policy, she is in reality declaring that, as between the views of the advocates of ever-conflicting policies, she does not care to make decision. Whether the Foreign Secretary shall be a Palmerston or a Russell, a Rosebery or a Granville; whether the dominating personality shall be a Beaconsfield wanting “to see the Queen dictatress of Europe” (a), or a Gladstone not wishing to dictate even to the Boers (b), Canada, it is said, must always be ready to maintain in war the view of the man who, for the moment, is in a position to send her an official invitation from London.

The impossibility of the Dominions exercising any influence upon British foreign policy is illustrated by the practical impossibility of even the British government satisfactorily directing the operations of their Foreign Minister. Note the following:—

LORD PALMERSTON:—Lord Palmerston was audacious, self-confident, intolerant of control. He acted, as his biographer said, upon the principle that:—

“whereas in home affairs nothing is done without the decision of a Cabinet, and the leader in Parliament has only to explain the resolutions of the Cabinet; in Foreign Affairs a Minister is called upon every day of the week, and at any time, to write and speak to foreign Governments, or their representatives, on current business. If he could not do this with a certain degree of promptitude and freedom, he would lose all weight and influence with his own agents and with the agents of other Powers” (c).

LORD DERBY:—Lord Derby was a contrast to Palmerston. He was timid, tenacious, and stubborn. When in 1866, he became Foreign Secretary:—

“He compared his conduct in that great post to that of a man floating down a river and fending off from his vessel, as well as he could, the various obstacles it encountered” (d).

When acting as Foreign Secretary in the Beaconsfield administration, in connection with the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-8, his timidities modified and thwarted the resolutions of the Cabinet. Of him Lady Gwendolen Cecil said in her recent book, *Robert Marquess of Salisbury*:—

“His peculiar characteristics, intensified, no doubt, by the pressure upon him during the last two years, had long roused criticism among those who were intimately interested in the work of his department. Caution had developed into inertia; Cabinet

(a) Kennedy, op. cit., p. 47.

(b) After Majuba Hill.

(c) Ashley: *Life of Lord Palmerston*, vol. ii, p. 194.

(d) *Ency. Brit.* tit. *Derby, Earl of*, p. 68.

decisions were emasculated in the despatches which should have embodied them; ambassadors were left without instructions—foreign governments without reply; initiative had almost ceased, while even negotiations already engaged stumbled to a standstill amidst the silences of Downing Street His colleagues deeply resented his remaining with them for the purpose of hampering a policy upon which they were all agreed" (a).

Referring to Lord Salisbury's experiences, Lady Gwendolen says:—

"It was an axiom of his that, in foreign affairs, the choice of a policy is as a rule of less importance than the methods by which it is pursued" (b).

SIR EDWARD GREY:—The chief element in Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy was the development of entente relations with France and Russia, and, for furtherance in that direction, he practiced secrecy not only upon the public and parliament, but upon his own colleagues (c). Wishing to put his ideas into immediate practice, he, after consultation with only three of his associates (d), gave France assurance of support in her pending quarrel over Morocco with Germany (1905-6), and, for that purpose, arranged consultations between the military officers of the two countries. Until long afterwards, his colleagues were unaware of this, and, until his speech on the day previous to the recent war (3 August 1914), parliament knew nothing of that first step toward the creation of "an obligation of honor" (as Mr. Lloyd George afterwards termed it) on the part of the United Kingdom to aid France in case of European war. The obligation was consummated by Sir Edward's subsequent conduct and his letter of 22 November 1912 to the French Ambassador. After all this, and notwithstanding it, the existence of a y obligation was categorically denied, on several occasions, in parliament (e). In his book *How the War Came*, Lord Loreburn, a member of the government, said:—

"Sir Edward Grey became, on 12th November 1905, Foreign Secretary in Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Government. He stepped right into the pending dispute about Morocco, and such was the course taken that, before he had been a month in office, an immense stride was made in the development of intimate relations between this country and France. Very great importance attaches to what then occurred, for it gave a new direction to our foreign policy from that day right up to the outbreak of the war" (f).

(a) Pp. 208, 210. It was this same Lord Derby, who at the time of Canadian federation, declined to agree to the title "The Kingdom of Canada." Sir John A. Macdonald afterwards said in writing to Baron Knutsford (18 July 1899): "On reading the above over I see that it will convey the impression that the change of title from *Kingdom of Canada* was caused by the Duke of Buckingham. This is not so. It was made at the instance of Lord Derby, who feared the first name would wound the sensibilities of the Yankees. I mentioned this incident in our history to Lord Beaconsfield at Hughenden in 1879, who said, 'I was not aware of the circumstances, but it is so like Derby—a very good fellow, but who lives in a region of perpetual funk' " (Pope: *Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald, 1840-1891*, p. 451).

(b) P. 136. Cf. A. L. Kennedy: *Old Diplomacy and New*, p. 43.

(c) Lord Loreburn, one of the colleagues, in his book *How the War Came* (pp. 76-81), makes strong complaint of that action.

(d) Asquith, Haldane, and through Haldane, it is said (Loreburn doubts it), with the Prime Minister, Campbell-Bannerman.

(e) 10 and 24 March 1913; 28 April and 14 June 1914.

(f) P. 76.

FOREIGN OFFICE PRACTICE:—By his action, Sir Edward Grey was only developing still further the practice which has obtained in recent years of the Foreign Secretary himself—or at most in consultation with the Prime Minister—determining and directing foreign policy. There has grown up a well-observed convention that men in opposition will not criticise the foreign policy of the government (a), and this, by relieving the cabinet of responsibility, has led to the devolution of it upon the Foreign Minister. In his recent book *Canadian Constitutional Studies*, Sir Robert Borden correctly said:—

“The foreign policy of the British Government has been largely directed not by the Cabinet as a whole, but by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. It does not appear that their colleagues were consulted except upon questions of great moment” (b).

Abdication by the cabinet of the right to maintain close supervision over the work of the Foreign Office has made still more ridiculous the idea that Canada should feel herself bound to support by military force whatever the Foreign Secretary may do.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE:—Climax in individual initiative was reached when Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill, without the knowledge of the Foreign Minister, issued the amazing manifesto of 16 September last (c). Only two, or three, of the members of the British cabinet were consulted, and probably no one of them, with the exception of the two principal actors, saw the manifesto until he scanned his Sunday newspaper.

COLLEAGUES AND DOMINIONS:—Very clearly if a Foreign Minister finds consultation with his colleagues inconvenient, he cannot be expected to defer his decisions until he has received cabled opinions from the ends of the earth. Strong men in office will give to circumstances the desired interpretation and trend, and do as they please. The Boer war arose because Chamberlain was Colonial Secretary; and the United States intervened in the Morocco quarrel between France and Germany because Roosevelt was President. Lloyd George did as he pleased, and varied from week to week. If British governmental colleagues have little hold upon British Foreign Ministers, how can it be possible that the Dominions can either assist in giving direction to British foreign policy, or (what in some respects is more important) in determining the tone to be employed in international communications?

VERY RECENT EXPERIENCE:—Perhaps the most surprising il-

(a) For the first time in thirty years, this rule has recently been disregarded, Mr. Lloyd George's actions in connection with the Near East crisis of September-October last having been sharply criticised.

(b) Pp. 87-8.

(c) Ante, p. 45.

lustration of the lack of knowledge among members of British governments was supplied by recent debates in the House of Lords. Viscount Grey said:—

“I am most apprehensive about the commitments we had entered into, and I urge upon the Government that they should go carefully into the commitments which the late Government have left us. (Hear, hear.) I hope that some time the Government will be able to give a clear statement exactly what our obligations are, and that they will be the first to take into confidence the great sister nations beyond the seas which form the Empire” (a).

To this Lord Salisbury, the President of the Council, made the astonishing answer:—

“As regards Mesopotamia, we feel very acutely all that the noble Viscount said. We are examining very carefully the obligations into which we have entered, and we shall be the first to take into confidence the great sister nations beyond the seas which form the Empire” (b).

Mr. Bonar Law became Prime Minister on 26 October, and on 24 November his government was inquiring as to “the obligations into which we have entered.” When I find out, he in effect said, I shall tell those who, two months previously, had been asked to send contingents to Asia Minor!

CANADA'S POLITICAL STATUS.

WAR:—On various occasions, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, while maintaining the absolute right of Canada to participate in British wars or to refrain, admitted, as a matter of international law, that when the United Kingdom was at war, Canada was also at war. Is that still true?

While Canada was a colony; while she was a part of the British Empire; while, in other words, the relation of dominant and subordinate existed, Canada undoubtedly was at war, or peace, according as was the situation in London. Now that, as the imperialists—the imperialists particularly—assert, Canada's status is one not of subordination but of equality, is that true?

It may be said that to declare war is the prerogative of the King, and that by his act all his subjects are bound. But, for two reasons, that is not correct. First, if Canada's status is equal in all respects to that of the United Kingdom, and their only political nexus is the King, then a declaration of war by the King, in his capacity as sovereign of the United Kingdom, would have no effect in Canada; even as a similar declaration, in his capacity as sovereign of Canada, would have no effect

(a) *The Times*, 24 November 1922.

(b) *Ibid.*

in the United Kingdom. That is well settled. For when the Georges were Kings of both the United Kingdom and Hanover, they were, on occasion, in one capacity at peace, and in the other at war (a). The second reason is that the prerogative right has disappeared. In these days, our King acts upon the separate advice of each of several groups of ministers, acting independently. The ministers are controlled by their respective parliaments. And given the basis of political equality, no group of Ministers and no parliament can act or speak for any other group or parliament.

But can the King have two conflicting foreign policies? Certainly not. Indeed, according to our system, he cannot have one. The parliaments frame the policies, and these may vary, and even conflict, in international as in domestic affairs. Can the King approve, for example, a dozen or more divergent laws on the liquor question? Personally, he cannot. Constitutionally, he can, and complacently he does.

Recent events have demonstrated the correctness of this view. In his extremely interesting and important speech in the House of Commons of 2 September 1919, Sir Robert Borden, referring to the peace conference at Paris, spoke as follows (*Italics now added*):—

“It is desirable to note an important development in constitutional practice respecting the signature of the various Treaties concluded at the Conference. Hitherto it has been the practice to insert an article or reservation providing for the adhesion of the Dominions. In view of the new position that had been secured and of the part played by Dominion representatives at the peace table, we thought this method inappropriate and undesirable in connection with the Peace Treaty. Accordingly I proposed that the assent of the King as High Contracting Party to the various Treaties should, in respect of the Dominions, be signified by the signature of the Dominion plenipotentiaries, and that the preamble and other formal parts of the Treaties should be drafted accordingly. This proposal was adopted in the form of a memorandum by all the Dominion Prime Ministers at a meeting which I summoned, and was put forward by me on their behalf to the British Empire Delegation, by whom it was accepted. The proposal was subsequently adopted by the Conference and the various Treaties have been drawn up accordingly so that the Dominions appear therein as signatories, and *their concurrence in the Treaties is thus given in the same manner as that of other nations.*”

This important constitutional development involved the issuance by the King, as High Contracting Party, of Full Powers to the various Dominion Plenipotentiary delegates. In order that such powers issued to the Canadian Plenipotentiaries might be based upon formal action of the Canadian Government, an Order-in-Council was passed on April 10, 1919, granting the necessary authority. Accordingly I addressed a communication to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom requesting that necessary and appropriate steps should be taken to establish the connection between this Order-in-Council and the issuance of the Full Powers by his Majesty, so that it might formally appear of record that *they were issued on the responsibility of the Government of Canada*

(a) The subject is dealt with in my *Kingdom Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 181-6; vol. II, p. 201.

..... The same indomitable spirit which made her capable of that effort and sacrifice made her equally incapable of accepting at the Peace Conference, in the League of Nations, or elsewhere, a status inferior to that accorded to nations less advanced in their development, less amply endowed in wealth, resources, and population, no more complete in their sovereignty, and far less conspicuous in their sacrifices."

In other words, the status of Canada was claimed to be not inferior to that of Bolivia, or Brazil, or Ecuador, or Guatemala, or Haiti, etc., all independent and sovereign states.

It is important to observe how Canada's constitutional development during the war produced the striking contrast between the way she entered it and the way she emerged—between acknowledgment of subordination and assertion of equality. In formation of the policies which produced the war, Canada had no share. When, on August 1 1914, she offered her support, the United Kingdom was not at war, and whether she would be engaged in war, and, if so, for what reason, was uncertain. Canada was part of the British Empire, and was bound by the act of the British government. On the other hand, when the time for ending the war arrived, Canada assumed the attitude described by Sir Robert.

Further than that, Canada insisted that, so far as she was concerned, there would be no peace without the assent of her parliament. Answering questions put to him by Mr. Fielding as to the effect of refusal by the Canadian parliament to ratify the Versailles treaty of peace, Sir Robert said (*Italics now added*):—

"His Majesty the King and his advisers have recognized the rights of this Parliament to express its opinion upon this Treaty. I made that pledge to Parliament, and the British Government have been informed of that pledge. They recognize the situation, and they are not disposed to deal with this Treaty, so far as Canada is concerned, apart from the approval of the Canadian Parliament..... I tell him (Mr. Fielding) that *it is recognized by the Crown of Great Britain that this Treaty must be submitted to the Canadian Parliament for its approval*, and that we desire, we insist, upon the judgment of the Canadian Parliament in regard to it before we advise the King on behalf of Canada that the Treaty should be ratified..... If my hon. friend means that, notwithstanding the arrangements which have been made, the conventions which have been recognized, the status which has been accorded to the Dominions during recent years, we are still subject to have this Treaty ratified by His Majesty on behalf of Canada whether the Parliament of Canada is willing to ratify it or not, then I tell him that *he is dealing in ancient history and that his ideas should advance with the progress of recent years..... His suggestion was that ratification by the Parliament of Canada is merely a farce, that the Government of the United Kingdom possesses such constitutional right in respect of this Dominion that they can impose their will upon us without regard to this Parliament. I repeat that if such is the opinion of the hon. member he is thinking in terms of a hundred years ago and not of to-day.*"

All this seems to establish pretty clearly the following:—

1. Canada's emergence from war is a matter within her own exclusive control.

2. Consequently, if, being in a state of war, she chooses to remain there, she may do so even if the United Kingdom acts otherwise.

3. Consequently, Canada may be at war with a nation with whom the United Kingdom is at peace.

4. Consequently, the idea that when the United Kingdom is at war, Canada is at war, is "ancient history," and any one who remains of that opinion "is thinking in terms of a hundred years ago." A hundred? Perhaps better say ten. No matter. It is not, at all events, the thinking of "to-day."

EUROPE OR NORTH AMERICA?

Geographically, Canada is a part of the North American continent. Is she, for war-purposes, to regard herself as part of Europe? Is she to renounce all hope of future peace? Separated by the Atlantic, and for some purposes by the Mediterranean also, from wars of nationalistic rivalries, is she to engage in ever-recurring wars among the hate-exchanging peoples of far-distant countries. Why should she? She cannot placate them. She cannot make French love Germans; nor Germans love Slavs; nor Slavs love Magyars; nor Magyars love Serbs; nor Serbs love Italians; nor Italians love Greeks; nor Greeks love Turks; nor Turks love British. She cannot fulfil for any of these peoples what they call their "legitimate aspirations."

With their strifes and their hatreds, Canada must keep herself unassociated. They must learn by heavy and still heavier experience that wars breed wars, and not, as they were told "a thousand years of peace." They must learn to understand one another, to appreciate one another, even to sympathize with one another. From that attitude of mind, unfortunately, they are infinitely farther removed than in 1914. They will fight, and fight and, fight again. Canada is not European. She is North American. Let her pursue a policy based upon that fact.

But shall we leave the United Kingdom to face these dangers alone? Political leaders as well as students, are learning that, for creation of the dangers, British statesmen are by no means free from responsibility. And for the Near East crisis of September-October last three or four of them must bear the entire blame. Such facts, however, are material

only, as demonstration that Canadians have no assurance that future British policy will be such as we can approve; and as ample justification for the assertion of a right to determine for ourselves (1) whether the stated cause is just; (2) whether, from Canadian point of view, it is worth a war; and (3) whether war is unavoidable. On none of these points shall we forego investigation, and the exercise of judgment. We shall not sacrifice Canadian lives save in defence of Canada, or in conservation of direct Canadian interests. We shall remember the language of Mr. Meighen, who, when accepting the freedom of London (1921), pointed to the contrast between the British and the Canadian situations as follows:—

“Our geography is different, our neighborhood is different, our racial composition is different. The assets stored by nature in our soil—they are also different. No two nations of this Empire have the same path to travel. Each encounters difficulties and enjoys advantages all its own.Canada, for example, is a nation of about 9,000,000 spread over half a continent. You are 43,000,000 people gathered on two small islands. You have a homogenous population. Only about one-half of ours have origin in these islands, and one-third are of French descent. Your transportation is almost wholly by sea, ours is mainly by land. But the contrast that is emphasised most is this. You are a mighty nation, for five centuries in the forefront of the world, you live on the edge of Europe, and around you are great competitive Powers. Your foreign policy has of necessity been the chief pre-occupation of your government. We are a young nation just grown to a nation's stature. We have one neighbor and one only, and that one an industrial colossus. It lies four thousand miles along our border, producing what we produce, and doing constant battle to forestall us in the world's markets. There is the big dominating fact that meets Canadians every morning. Save for the period of the great war, commercial questions have absorbed our minds. To achieve a measure of independence in commerce and transportation has been the constant care of our statesmen” (a).

That being all conspicuously true, the question for us to answer is, why, if Canada “encounters difficulties and enjoys advantages all her own,” she should surrender her advantages and assume the difficulties of a nation that lives on “the edge of Europe.”

We shall remember also the contrast drawn by Sir Robert Borden in his valuable *Canadian Constitutional Studies* between conditions in the two continents:—

“Of those who took part in the Peace Conference at Paris some at least returned to this continent with a sense of depression. The fierce antagonisms, the ancient hatreds, and the bitter jealousies of European nations there assembled were not inspiring. Neither in its method nor in its results can the highest results be claimed for the Peace Conference. The creation or recognition of numerous small states, whose populations are wholly untrained in self-government, can hardly assist in preventing war.On this continent two nations speaking the same language constitute in effect one community

(a) Canadian Press Despatch, 15 July 1921.

in social and business aspects and relations. Each has its own laws and institutions. Each is jealous of its rights and privileges, each has its own intense national spirit. At times there are strong differences, but there is no bitterness and no hatred. Therein is a vivid contrast to what may be observed in continental Europe" (a).

Can any one supply reason why Canada should associate herself with the antagonisms, and hatreds, and jealousies of distracted Europe?

Under present circumstances, the chief value to France of her colonies is that they are fighting-men-reservoirs, upon which she can draw at will. In the late war, hundreds of thousands of Senagalese, Algerians, Moors, etc., fought against Germany, while natives of the German colonies fought equally well in her support. We pity these poor people—at least I do. Knowing nothing of the merits of the quarrel which set Europe aflame, and having no interest in the affair, they killed and were killed. We pity them but what of ourselves? Astonishing, *a priori*, as it would seem, large numbers of our people applaud the idea that as the relations of untutored Africans are to France so (for military purposes) ought to be the relations of Canadians to the United Kingdom. They would not, of course, phrase the thought in that particular way. They would prefer to urge that, as part of the British Empire "we must do our share." They would fool us (and themselves) with a phrase.

Africans can offer two excuses for their renunciation of the chief of all liberties—liberty to fight or remain at peace—namely (1) their inexperience in the arts of national government, and (2) subjection to the control of a people stronger than they. Canadians have no excuse. We may choose between war-freedom and war-bondage. We may assert a right to determine for ourselves; or we may renounce that right and do as we are told. We may resent the whistle; or we may obey it. We may act as an intelligent, self-respecting people; or we may proclaim our contentment with serfdom. One or other of the alternatives we must choose. I feel certain that our parliament and our people will never class themselves with bull-terriers and French negroes.

May I not urge upon Canadian imperialists that, in view of the ratification, by the imperial parliament, of the constitution of The Irish Free State, they ought to reconsider their attitude toward this great question. For in that constitution there are the following provisions:—

"Article 1. The Irish Free State is a co-equal member of the Community of Nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.

(a) Pp. 139-140.

Article 2. All power of government and all authority, legislative, executive, and judicial, are derived from the people, and the same shall be exercised in the Irish Free State through the organizations established by or under, and in accord with, this Constitution.

Article 3. Every person domiciled in the Irish Free State at the time of the coming into operation of the Constitution, who was born in Ireland, or either of whose parents was born in Ireland, or who has been so domiciled in the area of the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State for not less than seven years, is a citizen of the Irish Free State and shall within the limits of the Irish Free State enjoy the privileges and be subject to the obligations of such citizenship, provided that any such person being a citizen of another State may elect not to accept the citizenship hereby conferred; and the conditions governing the future acquisition and termination of citizenship in the Irish Free State shall be determined by law. Men and women have equal rights as citizens."

"*Article 48.* Save in the case of actual invasion, the Irish Free State shall not be committed to active participation in any war without the assent of Parliament."

SUMMARY.

The conclusions arrived at in the foregoing dissertation may be summarized as follows:—

1. That Canada, without hesitation or investigation, ought to hold herself in readiness to engage in war merely because so requested by the British government, is an assertion unsupported by reason and incompatible with the interests, the self-respect, and the dignity of Canada. It is an attitude condemned by the Macdonald-Sicotte government, by Sir John A. Macdonald, and by Sir Wilfrid Laurier (a).

2. If Canada may, in any true sense, be said to be still a part of the British Empire, the relationship implies protection by the dominant of the subordinate, and not, contrariwise, foreign war-assistance of the dominant by the subordinate (b). If Canada is not really a part of the British Empire, but a nation enjoying a status equal to that of the United Kingdom, obligation can be created only by treaty (c). And there is none.

3. For three reasons, no obligation of gratitude necessitates participation by Canada in British wars: (1) Nothing in our history demands our gratitude. (2) Were there cause for gratitude, it could not impose an obligation to participate in wars which we do not approve. And (3) were there cause for gratitude, "Lord God, we have paid in full."

4. British wars of the past have not been such as to constitute a guarantee that those of the future will be undertaken for purposes which we could approve, or which would subserve our interests (d).

(a) Ante, pp. 6-8.

(b) Ante, pp. 8-11.

(c) Ante, p. 2.

(d) Ante, pp. 11-19.

5. Mr. Rowell's statement with reference to the war of 1914-18 is accurate:

"Fifty thousand Canadian soldiers under the sod in Europe is the price Canada has paid for the European statesmanship which drenched the continent in blood" (a).

6. The plannings of the Allies, during the great war, with reference to the partition of Turkish territory form a record of overweening imperialistic desire for territorial expansion (b).

7. The conduct of affairs since the Turkish armistice of 30 October 1918 is a record of persistent self-seeking (c); of stimulation of the Greeks in attacks upon the Turks (d); of withdrawal of support from the Greeks (e); of separate settlement with the Turks by France and Italy (1921); of faltering and vacillating persistence by the United Kingdom (f); of endeavor by the George-Churchill combination to establish a British control of the Straits (g); and, finally, of an acknowledgment of the defeat of that absurd scheme (h).

8. While still pursuing the purpose, the George-Churchill flaming manifesto was issued without consultation with the British Allies; without the knowledge of the Foreign Minister, Lord Curzon; and without previous communication with the Dominions (i). The British invitation to Rumania and Jugo-Slavia to participate in military operations was declined (j). The invitation to Canada and South Africa to send contingents produced dilatory answers (k). France and Italy disapproved the proposal (l). And the British government, left without support, finally agreed to the terms proposed by the Turks (m).

9. A practice has arisen of making pretence of consultation by the British Foreign Office with the Dominions with reference to formation and conduct of foreign policy (n). And, based upon the pretence, assertion is sometimes made that thereby we have assumed an obligation to participate in all British wars. The pretence is merely a pretence. But, to some extent, it compromises us, and it should therefore be ended.

10. So far from it being possible that British foreign policy can be conducted in consultation with four far-away governments (o), the British cabinet itself has difficulty in exercising control over the Foreign Minister (p). In recent years, the Foreign Minister and the Prime

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| (e) Ante, p. 27. | |
| (b) Ante, pp. 29-31. And see Toynbee, <i>op. cit.</i> , pp. 42, 56. | |
| (c) Ante, pp. 33-69. | (d) Ante, pp. 33-5. |
| (e) Probably justified. We have not the whole story. | |
| (f) Upon this subject see Toynbee, <i>op. cit.</i> , pp. 36, 145-7. | |
| (g) Ante, pp. 57-61. | (h) Ante, p. 61. |
| (i) Ante, p. 49. | (j) Ante, p. 47. |
| (k) Ante, p. 49-50. | (l) Ante, pp. 50-1. |
| (m) Ante, pp. 55-7. | (n) Ante, pp. 69-76. |
| (o) Ante, p. 71. | (p) Ante, pp. 77-80. |

Minister, save on occasions of special moment, act upon their own judgment (a). Sir Edward Grey took the first momentous step toward military association with France in case of European war, after consultation with only three of his colleagues, and, although he placed his country under "an obligation of honor" to assist France, he declared in parliament that no obligation existed (b). Lloyd George, although not Foreign Minister, to some extent assumed the conduct of foreign affairs, and, on a recent notable occasion, issued a war-manifesto which the Foreign Minister read the next morning in the newspapers "with consternation" (c).

11. Canada's status with reference to foreign affairs is in process of rapid development. Recent practice indicates that the statement "When the United Kingdom is at war, Canada is at war" is not now unqualifiedly true (d).

12. Canada is situated in the North American continent. Her foreign policy ought to be based upon that indisputable fact. She ought to abstain from engulfment in the affairs—now more than ever perturbed—of Europe and the Near East. She ought to give no pledges with reference to future actions (e).

13. While many Canadians will refuse to accept this last statement, I trust that there are very few who would agree that our government should have the power to commit Canada to participate in war without the authority of parliament (f).

(a) Ante, p. 79.
(c) Ante, p. 49.
(e) Ante, pp. 83-6.

(b) Ante, p. 78.
(d) Ante, pp. 80-3.
(f) Ante, p. 86.

